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The law grants individuals the broad freedom of disposition to decide 
how their property should be distributed upon death. The rationale 
underlying freedom of disposition is that the choices of individual donors 
produce results that maximize social welfare. Policymakers are rightfully 
skeptical that they can craft a mandatory estate plan that fits all situations 
or that probate courts can consistently and accurately assess the merits of 
particular dispositions of property. By contrast, the donor is in the best 
position to evaluate her own specific circumstances and to place property 
in the hands of the donees who will benefit the most. 
The donor, however, is not the sole decision-maker regarding the 
disposition of her property after death. To be sure, she enjoys broad 
freedom to craft an estate plan to her liking. But when the donor decides 
to make a gift to a particular donee, the donee must also make a decision. 
Specifically, she must decide either to accept the gift from the donor or to 
reject it. Whereas the donor’s discretion to decide which testamentary gifts 
to make is referred to as freedom of disposition, the donee’s discretion to 
decide which testamentary gifts to accept or to reject can be labeled 
“freedom of inheritance.” 
Although legal scholars have paid much attention to the donor’s 
freedom of disposition and have explained that it plays an important role 
in maximizing social welfare, relatively little attention has been paid to 
the donee’s freedom of inheritance and the role it plays in maximizing the 
utility generated from the donor’s estate. To fill this analytical void, this 
Article defines the donee’s freedom of inheritance and identifies how it 
works in concert with the donor’s freedom of disposition to maximize 
social welfare. Ultimately, this Article argues that the donee’s freedom of 
inheritance is an important part of the process of transferring wealth after 
death and that policymakers should strive to facilitate the donee’s exercise 
of this freedom when crafting the law of succession. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Freedom of disposition is the cornerstone of the modern law of succession.1 
Individuals enjoy nearly unfettered discretion to decide how property should be 
distributed upon death,2 and the law is largely designed to facilitate the exercise of 
this freedom.3 Because of freedom of disposition’s central role within the law of 
succession, it is easy to view the decision-making process regarding inheritance as 
one-sided—the donor decides what property the donee should receive upon her 
death, and the donee gladly accepts the gift when that time comes. Although this 
view of inheritance is perhaps intuitive, the donee is not a passive participant in the 
disposition of the donor’s property. To the contrary, when the donor decides to name 
a donee as a beneficiary of her estate, the donee must make a decision of her own. 
After the donor’s death, she must decide whether to accept the gift from the donor 
or to reject it.4 Whereas the donor’s discretion to decide which testamentary gifts to 
make is referred to as “freedom of disposition,” the donee’s discretion to decide 
which testamentary gifts to accept or to reject can be labeled “freedom of 
inheritance.”5 
Although freedom of disposition’s primary role within the law of succession is 
unmistakable, the role of freedom of inheritance is not clearly defined or well 
																																								 																				
1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. 
a, (AM. LAW INST. 2003); Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante 
Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1133–34 (2013); Robert H. 
Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 
643 (2014); see also infra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
2 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. 
a, (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of 
their property as they please.”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping 
Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 882–85 (2012) (“Americans enjoy 
nearly unbridled testamentary freedom, a right that has been fully engrained in the American 
psyche.”). 
3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. 
c, (AM. LAW INST. 2003); JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND 
ESTATES 1 (9th ed. 2013). 
4 See infra Part II. 
5 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1133 n.37 (“Testamentary freedom, i.e., a donor’s right to 
select beneficiaries is technically distinct from the freedom of inheritance, i.e., the donee’s 
right to receive property . . . .”). The term “freedom of inheritance” is rarely used within legal 
scholarship. See, e.g., Robert J. Lynn, Legal and Economic Implications of the Emergence 
of Quasi-Public Wealth, 65 YALE L.J. 786, 787 n.4 (1956) (quoting Josiah Stamp, 
Inheritance: Economic Aspects, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 357 (1937)). In addition 
to the meaning ascribed to it in this Article, freedom of inheritance is sometimes used to 
describe “the freedom of an owner at death to avoid confiscation of her property by the state.” 
Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 
1, 6 n.16 (1992); see Eike G. Hosemann, Protecting Freedom of Testation: A Proposal for 
Law Reform, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 419, 421 n.5 (2014); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1133 
n.37. 
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understood. Because freedom of disposition has received substantial scholarly 
attention, significant issues, such as why the donor has broad liberty to distribute 
property at death and how the law should facilitate the exercise of this freedom, have 
been deeply explored.6 By contrast, because freedom of inheritance has resided in 
obscurity, similarly important questions regarding the donee’s discretion to accept 
or to reject testamentary gifts have gone unanswered. To fill this analytical void, this 
Article defines the donee’s freedom of inheritance and identifies the rationales that 
justify this freedom’s place within the law of succession. Ultimately, this Article 
argues that the donee’s freedom of inheritance is an important part of the process of 
transferring wealth after death and that policymakers should strive to facilitate the 
donee’s exercise of this freedom when crafting the law of succession. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes freedom of disposition’s 
fundamental status within the law of succession, including the rationales underlying 
this freedom. Part II then shifts the Article’s focus to the related, yet overlooked 
freedom of inheritance. Specifically, Part II differentiates the donee’s freedom of 
inheritance from the donor’s freedom of disposition and explains why the law grants 
the donee the discretion to accept or to reject transfers from the donor’s estate. Part 
III concludes the Article by exploring how the law should facilitate the donee’s 
exercise of freedom of inheritance. 
 
I.  FREEDOM OF DISPOSITION 
 
The modern law of succession is founded upon the donor’s freedom of 
disposition.7 As The Restatement (Third) of Property (the “Restatement”) explains, 
“The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom of 
disposition,” and as such, “[p]roperty owners have the nearly unrestricted right to 
																																								 																				
6 See infra Part I. 
7 See In re Estate of Malloy, 949 P.2d 804, 806 (Wash. 1998) (“A basic principle 
underlying any discussion of the law of wills is that an individual has the right and the 
freedom to dispose of his or her property, upon death, according to the dictates of his or her 
own desires.”); THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 349 (5th ed. 2011) (“Freedom of disposition is a 
hallmark of the American law of succession.”); Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential 
Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 444–45 (2012) (“Testamentary 
freedom is so fundamental that it has consistently been heralded as the keystone of the law 
of succession.”); Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 
587, 632 (1989) (“[C]ourts traditionally exalt freedom of testation and the fulfillment of 
testamentary intent as central to gratuitous transfers policy.”); Paula A. Monopoli, Toward 
Equality: Nonmarital Children and the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
995, 1010 n.94 (“Freedom of testation and testator’s intent are frequently identified as 
paramount jurisprudential touchstones in the area of trusts and estates.”); E. Gary Spitko, 
Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural 
Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 278 (1999) 
(“The ideal of testamentary freedom grounds the law of testation.”). 
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dispose of their property as they please.”8 Whereas the Restatement describes the 
ability of owners to dispose of property both during life and at death, Professor 
Robert Sitkoff specifically describes freedom of disposition’s place within the law 
of succession:  
 
The American law of succession embraces freedom of disposition, 
authorizing dead hand control, to an extent that is unique among modern 
legal systems . . . . The right of a property owner to dispose of his or her 
property on terms that he or she chooses has come to be recognized as a 
separate stick in the bundle of rights called property.9  
 
Because of the primacy of dead-hand control, an analysis of the donee’s freedom of 
inheritance must build upon an understanding of the donor’s freedom of disposition. 
This section therefore explains the mechanics of and rationales underlying this 
freedom. 
 
A.  Mechanics 
 
Traditionally, the donor exercises freedom of disposition by executing a will in 
which she expresses how she wants her estate distributed.10 In particular, the donor 
specifies what property goes to which donees.11 However, because a will becomes 
effective only upon death, the donor retains full ownership over her property, 
maintaining the right during life to do with her property as she pleases. 12 
																																								 																				
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2003). 
9 Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 643–44; see Cantrell v. Cantrell, No. M2002-02883-COA-
R3-CV, 2004 WL 3044907 *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (“A fundamental principle of 
the law of wills is that a testator is entitled to dispose of the testator’s property as he or she 
sees fit, regardless of any perceived injustice that may result from such a choice.”); 
Weisbord, supra note 2, at 882 (“The most fundamental guiding principle of American 
inheritance law is testamentary freedom—that the person who owns property during life has 
the power to direct its disposition at death.”). 
10 See Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the 
Will: An Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 156 (2008) (explaining that 
“estate planning . . . at one time involved not much more than the drafting and execution of 
a will”). 
11 A gift of particular property, such as a piece of real property, is called a specific 
bequest, and a gift of a general benefit, such as a sum of money, is called a general bequest. 
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 374. 
12  See John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying 
Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 335, 342 (2013) (“The interest of 
a prospective beneficiary under a will or will substitute does not ripen into a cognizable right 
until the donor’s death. Until then, a prospective beneficiary has a mere ‘expectancy’ that is 
subject to defeasance at the donor’s whim.”). 
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Furthermore, because a will is ambulatory, the donor can change her mind regarding 
the disposition of her estate by revoking or amending her will prior to death.13 
In addition to executing a will, the donor can exercise freedom of disposition 
by distributing property upon death through other avenues, such as life insurance 
policies, payable-on-death bank accounts, and revocable trusts.14 Scholars adopted 
the term “will substitute” to describe these instruments because they are the 
functional equivalents of wills.15 Specifically, the donor can retain ownership of 
property during life and designate a donee who takes ownership of the property after 
the donor’s death.16 For example, when the donor deposits funds in a payable-on-
death bank account, she retains ownership of the property and can do as she pleases 
with the account funds.17  Moreover, she can designate a beneficiary, who will 
become the owner of the account assets after her death.18  Under this scenario, 
ownership of the account funds transfers from the donor to the donee upon the 
donor’s death without the need for a will. Thus, within the context of contemporary 
estate planning, the donor’s options for exercising freedom of disposition have 
expanded to include not only the traditional will but also various will substitutes that 
function similarly to wills. 
  
																																								 																				
13 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 215. 
14 “A donor may exercise her freedom of disposition at death other than by will in 
probate. . . . [R]evocable inter vivos trusts, life insurance and other pay-on-death contracts, 
pension plans and retirement accounts, and other legal arrangements . . . have the effect of 
passing property at death outside of probate. Taken together, these will substitutes constitute 
a nonprobate system of private succession . . . .” Id. at 435; see Mark Glover, The Solemn 
Moment: Expanding Therapeutic Jurisprudence Throughout Estate Planning, 3 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. ONLINE 19, 19–20 (2015); see generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate 
Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108–09 (1984) 
(describing the “demand for probate avoidance” and the rise of “free-market competitors of 
the pro bate system”); Melanie B. Leslie & Steward E. Sterk, Revisiting the Revolution: 
Reintegrating the Wealth Transmission System, 56 B.C. L. REV. 61, 61–64, (2015) 
(describing the growth of a “system of non-probate transfers.”). 
15 See Grayson M.P. McCouch, Probate Law Reform and Nonprobate Transfers, 62 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 757, 758–59 (2008) (“Will substitutes, as the name implies, are designed to 
achieve the practical effect of a will—designating beneficiaries to receive property at the 
donor’s death . . . .”). 
16 See id. 
17 See Jordan v. Burgbacher, 883 P.2d 458, 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (“A POD account 
belongs to the original depositor during that person’s lifetime and not to the POD payee or 
payees.”). 
18 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
7.1 cmt. g (AM LAW INST. 2003) (“There are several types of payable-on-death 
arrangements. One is a POD bank account that is carried in the name of the depositor (the 
donor) and is ‘payable on the death of the depositor to’ the designated beneficiary.”).  
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B.  Rationales 
 
The underlying rationale of freedom of disposition has long been a topic of 
debate. Of the various justifications of freedom of disposition that have been 
proposed, perhaps the oldest, is that the donor has a natural right to distribute 
property at death. 19  Professors Adam Hirsch and William Wang explain this 
rationale as: “Having created wealth by the sweat of her brow, the testator is 
naturally free to do with it as she pleases—including passing it along to others.”20 
Although this natural rights rationale of freedom of disposition has deep roots,21 it 
also has long been questioned and has largely lost favor.22 
A second general explanation of freedom of disposition’s place within the 
modern law of succession is that most people expect and prefer to have broad liberty 
to dispose of property upon death.23 Professor Lewis Simes proposed this idea by 
suggesting that “the desire to dispose of property by will is very general, and very 
strong” and, as such, “[a] compelling argument in favor of it is that it accords with 
human wishes.” 24  The recognition of the strong political preference for broad 
freedom of disposition leads to the realization that freedom of disposition is difficult 
to restrain.25 Even if the law attempted to severally limit the ability to dispose of 
property upon death, for example by eliminating disposition of property by will, 
people would find ways around these limitations, such as by transferring property 
during life or by other means designed to transfer property at death.26 Similar to the 
natural rights theory,27  this pragmatic take on freedom of disposition does not 
adequately explain freedom of disposition’s central role in the modern law of 
succession.28 
																																								 																				
19 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 6–7. “Such a natural right was posited by 
Roman jurists.” Id. at 6 n.17. 
20 Id. at 6. 
21 See id. at 6–7 (explaining that seventeenth century commentators John Locke and 
Hugo Grotius supported the natural rights theory of freedom of disposition); see also Kelly, 
supra note 1, at 1135 n.48 (same).  
22  See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 6–7 (suggesting that “from at least the 
seventeenth century, ideologists have disputed the natural rights theory of testation” but that 
“after centuries in eclipse” the natural rights theory of freedom of disposition “has lately 
drawn flickers of judicial support”); see also Ronald Chester, Essay: Is the Right to Devise 
Property Constitutionally Protected? – The Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 SW. U. L. 
REV. 1195, 1195–96 (1995) (casting doubt on the validity of dead-hand control over 
property). 
23 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 14 (“[T]he power to bequeath comports with 
political preferences . . . .”). 
24 LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 21 (1955). 
25 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 11–12 (“A secondary justification for the right 
of testation is that it would in practice be difficult to curtail.”).  
26 See id. 
27 See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
28 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
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Whatever the merits of justifying freedom of disposition as either a natural right 
or a political preference, much of the discussion surrounding the underlying 
rationale of freedom of disposition now focuses on what Professor Daniel Kelly 
describes as “functional considerations.”29 He explains, “This functional perspective 
emphasizes the ‘social welfare’ of the parties and seeks to determine how the law 
can create the best incentives for the donor, donees, and other parties that a donor’s 
disposition of property may effect.”30 When viewed from this functional perspective 
that focuses on maximizing the wellbeing of society as a whole, broad freedom of 
disposition could be based upon several rationales,31 including that it increases the 
donor’s utility, increases the donee’s utility, and provides incentives that increase 
social welfare. 
 
1.  Donor Utility 
 
First, broad freedom of disposition increases the satisfaction of the donor.32 
Indeed, the ability to pass property upon death, particularly to close family members, 
can improve the welfare of individual members of society.33 As Professor Edward 
Halbach suggests, 
 
[A] society should be concerned with the total amount of happiness it can 
offer, and to many of its members it is a great comfort and satisfaction to 
know during life that, even after death, those whom one cares about can 
be provided for and may be able to enjoy better lives because of the 
inheritance that can be left to them.34 
 
																																								 																				
29 Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135. 
30 Id.; see Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the 
Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 432 (2001) (“The most prevalent justification for 
testamentary freedom is the utilitarian view which posits that testamentary freedom is not a 
right but rather a privilege offered for the purpose of motivating socially desirable 
behavior.”). 
31 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135–38; see also Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 6–13 
(listing the “varied” and “controversial . . . rationales for testamentary freedom”). 
32 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135–36. 
33 See Glover, Therapeutic Jurisprudential, supra note 7, at 443–46; see also Hirsch & 
Wang, supra note 5, at 8 n.26 (“The nature of that satisfaction – whether (or to what extent) 
it is genetically programmed (‘nepotism’) rather than derived from social interaction 
(‘altruism’), and whether it can involve altruistic impulses other than those signaling 
interdependent utilities with the beneficiaries – remains unclear.”). 
34 Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES AND 
FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 
5, at 8 (explaining that “modern social scientists” assume that “persons derive satisfaction 
out of bequeathing property to others”). 
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If freedom of disposition were substantially curtailed, a source of individual 
satisfaction would be eliminated, and overall societal happiness would decrease.35 
Freedom of disposition could therefore be explained as promoting social welfare by 
providing a source of happiness and satisfaction to individual donors. 
 
2.  Donee Utility 
 
Second, the donor’s ability to direct the disposition of property upon death 
allows for intelligent estate planning.36 Donors likely have a better understanding of 
how to distribute their wealth upon death in a way that maximizes the utility of 
donees rather than the policymakers who would direct the disposition of estates in 
the absence of freedom of disposition. 37  As Kelly explains, “compared to 
legislatures or courts, donors may possess better information about the 
circumstances of family members and other donees,” and “[t]his informational 
advantage may allow donors to select the highest-valued donee (e.g., a gifted or 
disabled child).” 38  If freedom of disposition were eliminated, the superior 
knowledge of donors would be ignored and property would likely be distributed in 
a less optimal way.39 As such, freedom of disposition could be based upon the 
rationale that it allows those with the best knowledge of familial need to direct 
wealth to its most beneficial use. 
  
																																								 																				
35 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65 (2004) 
(“In an important sense, bequeathing property is simply one way of using property. And 
therefore society should not interfere with bequests for the same general reason that it is 
undesirable for society to constrain the use of property. Namely, this tends to reduce 
individuals’ utility directly (a person will derive less utility from property if he wants to 
bequeath it but is prevented from doing so) . . . .”);  Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 8 (“To 
the extent that lawmakers deny persons the opportunity to bequeath freely, the subjective 
value of property will drop, for one of its potential uses will have disappeared.”); Gordon 
Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J.L. & ECON. 465, 474 (1971) (“Individuals before death 
would be injured if they are prohibited from passing on their estate to their heirs because it 
eliminates one possible alternative which they might otherwise choose.”). 
36 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 12–13; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136–37. 
37 See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive 
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 44 (1995) (“Certainly, benefactors can be expected to 
possess the information and insight into their families’ affairs necessary to distribute their 
wealth in a rational manner.”). 
38 Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136; see Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give 
Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163, 
177 (1996) (“Testamentary freedom . . . allows the testator to weigh the varying needs of his 
family.”); Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 
41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 484 (2006) (“[T]he testator . . . can distribute property in 
accordance [with] each family members’ needs.”). 
39 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136–37. 
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3.  Incentives 
 
Finally, freedom of disposition provides two important incentives that increase 
social welfare. First, freedom of disposition promotes the maximization of societal 
wealth.40 The knowledge that one has the ability to direct the disposition of property 
at death provides individuals an incentive to be productive during life and to save 
and invest, rather than to consume.41 By contrast, if freedom of disposition were 
substantially restrained, this incentive for productivity and savings would disappear 
because a potential use of property would be eliminated.42 Individuals might work 
less and consume more during life,43 which, as Kelly suggests, “will affect not only 
the donor’s utility but also society’s savings and its capital base.”44 Thus, freedom 
of disposition could be justified as providing an incentive for productivity, which 
has overarching societal benefits. 
Second, freedom of disposition incentivizes intrafamily caregiving.45 If family 
members know that donors have the ability to direct the distribution of wealth upon 
death, they may be more willing to care for aging or ailing donors.46 The possibility 
of disinheritance incentivizes the provision of family caregiving, which in turn 
promotes overall social welfare. As Hirsch and Wang explain, freedom of 
disposition “serves the public interest” by “support[ing] . . . a market for the 
provision of social services” and “encourage[ing] . . . beneficiaries to provide [the 
donor] with care and comfort—services that add to the total economic ‘pie.’”47 
Therefore, although family members may provide care to donors absent the 
incentives created by the possibility of disinheritance,48  freedom of disposition 
might be justified as encouragement of intrafamily caregiving. 
																																								 																				
40 See id. at 1136. 
41 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 8 (“[F]reedom of testation creates an incentive 
to industry and saving.”); Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead 
Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 749 (1990) (“Allowing owners to give their assets and 
money to others, whether at death or inter vivos, creates an incentive for productive 
activities.”). 
42 See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 65 (explaining that restricting freedom of disposition 
“lowers [individuals’] incentives to work (a person will not work as hard to accumulate 
property if he cannot then bequeath it as he pleases)”). 
43  See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 8 (“[T]hwarted testators will choose to 
accumulate less property, and the total stock of wealth existing at any given time will 
shrink.”). 
44 Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136; see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 8 (“Testamentary 
freedom accordingly fulfills the normative goal of wealth maximization, which is advanced 
by its proponents as the best available barometer of utility maximization.”). 
45 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 9–11; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1137. 
46 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1137. 
47 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
48 See id. at 11 (“[T]he strongest argument against this rationale may be the practical 
observation that supplies of social services appear generally to be inelastic; they are 
forthcoming, in poor families as in rich, more or less irrespective of the suppliers’ inheritance 
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As illustrated above, freedom of disposition’s place within the law of 
succession is not necessarily explained by a single rationale. In the past, freedom of 
disposition may have enjoyed some support based upon the theory that the ability to 
transfer property upon death is a natural right.49 In modern times, perhaps freedom 
of disposition is simply explained as a political preference that would be difficult to 
curtail.50 However, regardless of the merits of these two rationales, most scholars 
today analyze freedom of disposition from a functional perspective that focuses on 
the maximization of social welfare.51 When viewed from this perspective, freedom 
of disposition could be justified as a way to increase donor utility,52 increase donee 
utility,53 and incentivize productivity and intrafamily caregiving.54 
 
II.  FREEDOM OF INHERITANCE 
 
Just as the law grants the donor the general freedom to decide how to distribute 
property upon death,55 the law also grants the donee the general freedom to decide 
whether to accept or to reject testamentary gifts. As Hirsch explains, “Most 
beneficiaries accept inheritances with open arms; other ones prefer, for whatever 
reason, to reject them. Under most circumstances today, beneficiaries are free to 
accept or reject an inheritance as they see fit.”56 The donee’s discretion over the 
acceptance of transfers from the donor’s estate can be labeled “freedom of 
inheritance.”57 Whereas the donor’s freedom of disposition has been the subject of 
much scrutiny, the donee’s freedom of inheritance has received substantially less 
attention. As such, this section describes the mechanics of freedom of inheritance 
and suggests potential rationales that might underlie this freedom. 
																																								 																				
prospects. Just as an assortment of motives drives persons to produce wealth, so does a 
complex of motives and emotions stimulate persons to care for each other.”). 
49 See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
50 See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
51 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135. 
52 See supra Part I.A. 
53 See supra Part I.B. 
54 See supra Part I.C. 
55 See supra Part I. 
56 Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2014). 
57 Others have described the donee’s discretion to accept or reject a transfer from the 
donor’s estate as a “freedom.” See, e.g., id. (using the term “beneficiaries’ freedom”); Joan 
B. Ellsworth, On Disclaimers: Let’s Renounce I.R.C. Section 2518, 38 VILL. L. REV. 693, 
698 (1993) (“The intended recipient’s freedom to accept or refuse an inter-vivos or 
testamentary gift has long been recognized by the courts . . . .”). However, the term “freedom 
of inheritance” has generally not been used in this context and, in fact, could be used in other 
contexts. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 6 n.16. Furthermore, the use of the term 
“inheritance” could suggest that this freedom applies only to gifts that are transferred through 
intestacy. However, for the sake of simplicity this Article uses the term “freedom of 
inheritance” to refer to the discretion to accept or to reject all transfers that flow from the 
donor after death, whether through intestacy, a will, a nonprobate transfer, or other type of 
transfer, such as the forced spousal share and distributions to creditors. 
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A.  Mechanics 
 
When the donor exercises her freedom of disposition and directs a posthumous 
transfer of property to a donee, the donee has an option.58 She can accept the transfer 
and take possession of the property.59 Alternatively, she can reject the gift, or, in the 
parlance of inheritance law, she can “disclaim” her interest in the property. 60 
Although freedom of inheritance is now expansive, the common law limited the 
donee’s discretion to disclaim posthumous gifts to those flowing through a will;61 as 
such, the donee could not disclaim a gift received through intestacy.62 However, all 
states have now adopted disclaimer statutes that supersede the common law and that 
extend the donee’s discretion to intestate transfers.63 Furthermore, mirroring the 
expansion of the donor’s freedom of disposition into will substitutes, such as 
revocable trusts and life insurance,64 the donee’s freedom of inheritance also extends 
to gifts flowing outside the probate system.65 Thus, under modern law, the donee 
can accept or reject a posthumous gift regardless of the form of the transfer. 
In addition to the donee’s general ability to disclaim posthumous gifts, whether 
under a will or through intestacy, freedom of inheritance also plays a role in the 
forced spousal share. 66  Although the donor generally enjoys broad freedom of 
																																								 																				
58 See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 588 (“The beneficiary of a gratuity may accept or reject 
it at his discretion.”). 
59 See Adam J. Hirsch, Revisions in Need of Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of 
Property Interests Act, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 110 (2001) (“In the usual course of events, 
most persons are inclined to accept any bequest of property that a testator has the good grace 
to leave them. However, nobler it is to give than to receive, receiving also has its charms.”). 
60 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140. “By traditional usage, an heir 
renounces; a beneficiary under a will disclaims. Today, the two words are used 
interchangeably as synonyms. The term disclaimer is the one more commonly used to 
describe the formal refusal to take by an heir or a beneficiary.” Id. at 140 n.81. 
61 See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 591. 
62 See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1904 (“Intestate property was ‘cast’ upon the heir and 
could not be disclaimed under the common law . . . .”). “The reason for this rule was that 
there must always be someone seised of the land who was liable for the feudal obligations, a 
reason of no importance today.” DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140. 
63 See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1904 (explaining that the traditional common law rule 
“persisted in several American states as late as the 1990s but . . . is now superseded 
everywhere by statute.”). 
64 See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
65 See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 706–07 (“Property passing by contract, rather than 
by gift, bequest or intestacy, may also be disclaimed. Life insurance proceeds and survivors’ 
benefits under employee plans are prime examples of such interests.”); Adam J. Hirsch, The 
Uniform Acts’ Loophole in Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 34 ESTATE PLANNING 20, 21 
(2007) (“A ‘disclaimer’ constitutes the rejection of an inheritance offered under a 
benefactor’s will or will-substitute, or by virtue of intestacy law.”). 
66 Freedom of inheritance, as defined by this Article, also plays a role in the rights of 
creditors to the donor’s estate. In particular, creditors are not required to seek payment from 
the donor’s estate, but instead can choose not to file a claim against the donor’s estate. 
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disposition,67 the surviving spouse of the donor is entitled to a share of the donor’s 
estate regardless of the donor’s intent.68 Even if the donor attempts to disinherit a 
surviving spouse by leaving behind a legally effective will that does not provide for 
the spouse, the law allows the spouse to share in the donor’s estate.69 The surviving 
spouse need not, however, take the forced share. Instead, the surviving spouse can 
choose to take according to the terms of the donor’s will.70 Therefore, like a donee 
can accept or disclaim a gift that the donor intends to give, a surviving spouse can 
reject the transfer that the law requires the donor to offer to the surviving spouse. 
This option to reject the forced spousal share is evident in an alternate name that is 
sometimes used to describe this transfer: the elective share.71 Indeed, this label 
perhaps better describes the rights of the surviving spouse, who is not forced to take 
the share but whom can elect to take the share if so inclined. Thus, by either 
accepting or declining her forced share, the surviving spouse exercises her freedom 
of inheritance. 
When a donee exercises her freedom of inheritance by rejecting a transfer from 
the donor’s estate, the donor does not select who should take the property in her 
place.72 Instead, the law typically holds that the disclaiming donee is treated as 
having predeceased the donor, in which case the disclaimed property is distributed 
to an alternate donee.73 If the donor specifically names an alternate donee who 
should take if the primary donee predeceases her, then the donor’s express intent 
governs the disposition of disclaimed property.74 If the donor does not provide for 
the contingency of a predeceasing donee, then the law provides rules of construction 
and interpretation to determine who should benefit instead of the named donee.75 
Under either scenario, a disclaiming donee does not have the power to specify who 
																																								 																				
67 See supra Part I. 
68 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 512–16; see, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 
2-201 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). 
69 See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 
UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1245 (“The power to devise is not complete in the separate property 
states . . . . In every separate property state, state law gives surviving spouses the right to 
make claims against their deceased spouses’ estates, even if the deceased spouses explicitly 
disinherited them.”). 
70 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 513. 
71 See id. 
72 See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 608 (“The disclaimant has no power to channel the 
inheritance to chosen takers in lieu of himself.”). 
73 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140.  
74 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 163 (“In the absence of testamentary instructions, 
disclaimed property goes to whomever would have received it had the disclaimant 
predeceased the benefactor, as determined by the state’s antilapse and intestacy statutes, but 
if a will does anticipate this contingency by naming a substitute beneficiary in the event that 
the primary beneficiary disclaims, that stipulation controls the devolution of the property.”). 
“Under UDPIA, a contingency clause specifying how a bequest will devolve in the event a 
beneficiary predeceases is broadly construed to govern the devolution of a bequest a 
surviving beneficiary disclaims.” Id. at 163 n.263. 
75 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 351–52, 357–61.  
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should take in her place. Indeed, freedom of inheritance extends only to the donee’s 
decision to accept or to reject a transfer from the donor’s estate, and as such, the 
donee has no influence over the consequences of her decision to disclaim.  
 
B.  Rationales 
 
As explained previously, the law’s grant of broad freedom of disposition is 
justified today as a way to maximize social welfare.76 More particularly, freedom of 
disposition is explained as not only maximizing the utility of the donor but also 
placing incentives on donors and donees that increase social welfare.77 Although 
freedom of inheritance has not been firmly placed within this welfare model, it can 
be seen as nicely complimenting the donor’s freedom of disposition in furthering the 
law’s social welfare maximization goal. Specifically, freedom of inheritance 
maximizes the donee’s welfare by providing her discretion to select the testamentary 
transfers that increase her individual utility. It also either increases the donor’s utility 
or does not affect her utility depending upon her reasons for giving. Finally, freedom 
of inheritance alleviates moral hazard problems and issues regarding imperfect 
information and transaction costs by allowing the donee to engage in postmortem 
estate planning. 
 
1.  Donee Utility 
 
The conventional rationale underlying freedom of inheritance focuses on 
individual autonomy and suggests that property should not be forced upon the 
donee. 78  For instance, the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act (the 
“UDPIA”) explains that “the principle behind all disclaimers” (and therefore 
freedom of inheritance generally) is that “no one can be forced to accept property.”79 
Although respect for the personal autonomy of the donee provides a specific 
rationale for freedom of inheritance, this explanation can be reframed so that the 
law’s respect of the donee’s autonomy is merely one of several mechanisms that the 
law employs to maximize social welfare. 
As explained previously, the law’s grant of broad freedom of disposition to the 
donor increases social welfare by maximizing the donor’s utility.80 Put simply, the 
																																								 																				
76 See supra Part I.B. 
77 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135. 
78 See Andrew S. Bender, Disclaimer Law: A Call for Statutory Reform, 2001 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 887, 892 (“The primary rationale was that an intended recipient could not have 
ownership thrust upon her. Essentially, recognition of disclaimers protected ‘[p]ersonal 
autonomy.’”); Hirsch, supra note 7, at 588 (“Personal autonomy and effectuation of intent 
have served as the traditional touchstones of this area of law.”). 
79  UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT § 5 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). The UDPIA has been incorporated into the Uniform 
Probate Code. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2–1101 to 2–1117 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). 
80 See supra notes 32–35 and accompany text. 
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donor receives benefit from the ability to direct the disposition of property after 
death.81 Just as the law’s respect of the personal autonomy of the donor maximizes 
the donor’s utility, the law’s respect of the personal autonomy of the donee 
maximizes the donee’s utility. The law’s respect for the donee’s autonomy to decide 
whether to accept or reject a transfer from the donor’s estate allows the donee to 
independently assess the utility of the transfer.82 Although oftentimes, if not most of 
the time, a transfer from the donor’s estate is beneficial to the donee,83 some transfers 
would negatively affect the donee’s utility.84 As the Supreme Court of Georgia 
explained long ago, “Property is a burden as well as a benefit, and whoever is 
unwilling to bear the burden for the sake of the benefit, is at liberty to decline both.”85 
Freedom of inheritance therefore allows the donee to weigh the benefits and burdens 
of the transfer, and if she decides that acceptance of the transfer would produce a net 
negative change in her utility, she can disclaim her interest in the property.86 
A donee might decide that a transfer from the donor’s estate would 
detrimentally affect her utility for various reasons.87 Most simply, the property might 
objectively be worthless. As Hirsch explains, “in the rare case where a bequest 
comprises property of negative value,” freedom of inheritance allows the donee to 
avoid the burdens of property that “no one will agree to take . . . off the beneficiary’s 
hands.” 88  Alternatively, the donor might have subjective motivations, such as 
religious, moral, or political reasons, for deciding to disclaim an interest in the 
donor’s estate.89 As one New York court explains, “[I]nstitutions have been known 
																																								 																				
81 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1147–50. 
82 See Bender, supra note 78, at 898 (“[T]he belief prevails that the disclaimant should 
not be forced to accept a gift if doing so would impose too great a burden on her. Essentially, 
there is a general agreement and recognition that any individual using a disclaimer in this 
manner possesses a valid motive.”). 
83 See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 694 (“One might think that very few sensible persons 
decide to reject a gratuitous transfer . . . .”). 
84 See Bender, supra note 78, at 898 (“[C]losely related to personal autonomy, is that 
disclaimers protect an intended beneficiary’s need to reject burdensome property.”). 
85 Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 707 (1879). 
86 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 117 (“Only later, after feudal incidents were abolished, 
did British courts come to allow disclaimers by devisees, for the very different purpose of 
permitting beneficiaries to escape bequests that might be ‘clothed in trust,’ or otherwise 
entail burdensome responsibilities.”). 
87 See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 709 (“The overall effect of a particular disclaimer 
should be advantageous to the disclaimant; indeed, it is often extremely beneficial. One 
commentator offers a list of twenty-seven different practical uses of disclaimers in different 
contexts.”). 
88 Hirsch, supra note 59, at 156 n.218; see Stephen E. Parker, Can Debtors Disclaim 
Inheritances to the Detriment of Their Creditors?, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 31, 32 (1993) (“[A] 
donee may want to reject a gift of property when the property is encumbered in an amount 
greater than its fair market value . . . .”). 
89 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 156 n.218. 
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to spurn gifts via trust which the institutions deemed subversive or hostile to their 
purposes or ideals. A like right extends to individuals.”90  
Finally, the donee’s decision to disclaim an interest in the donor’s estate might 
be driven, not by concerns regarding the property, but by a desire to be self-reliant.91 
Under this scenario, the disutility of the transfer stems not from the particular object 
of the gift but from the donative transfer generally. Thus, a transfer from the donor’s 
estate might for various reasons be detrimental to the donee. Consequently, by 
allowing the donee to accept only those transfers that are beneficial to her, the law’s 
respect for the autonomy of the donee increases social welfare. 
 
2.  Donor Utility 
 
In addition to maximizing the donee’s welfare by allowing her to assess the 
utility of accepting a transfer from the donor’s estate, freedom of inheritance 
maximizes the donor’s utility. This conclusion flows from the motivations that 
underlie the donor’s decision to direct property to the donee after death.92 One reason 
a donor might give a gift is to increase the utility of the donee.93 As Kelly explains, 
“A gift . . . may increase the donor’s happiness due to altruism. If a donor is 
altruistic, the donor’s utility is a function of the donees’ utility, i.e., the preferences 
of the donor incorporate the well-being of the donees.”94 Put differently, under this 
scenario, the utility of the donor is tied to the utility of the donee. If the donee’s 
utility increases as a result of the transfer, the donor’s utility also increases, and, 
likewise, if the donee’s utility decreases, the donor’s utility decreases. Therefore, 
when the donor is motivated by altruism, freedom of inheritance maximizes social 
welfare because if the donee were forced to accept a burdensome gift, not only would 
the donee’s utility be diminished, but so too would the donee’s. 
																																								 																				
90 In re Estate of Suter, 142 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1955). The court makes 
its point more eloquently: “Centuries ago, the Roman poet, Lucretius, enunciated the truism 
that, ‘What is food to one may be fierce poison to others.’ To [some] donee[s] [a] gift is not 
food, but a cup of hemlock which the law cannot force [them] to swallow.” Id. 
91 See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 629. 
92 See Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests? The Distributive and Welfare 
Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 STAN. L. REV. 641, 656 (1999) (“The various 
motives for bequest savings . . . carry quite different implications for the utility derived from 
bequests . . . .”); Louis Kaplow, On The Taxation of Private Transfers, 63 TAX L. REV. 159, 
176 (2009) (“[V]ariations in donor’s motives for giving often do matter, both for predicting 
behavior and for performing welfare analysis.”). 
93 See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 58 (“A major motivation of giving a gift is pure 
altruism: The donor cares about the well-being of the donee; that is, the donor obtains utility 
from the utility of the donee.”); Kaplow, supra note 92, at 176 (“One possibility is that donors 
are to an extent altruistic, which is to say that raising the utility of their donees increases their 
own utility. Altruism seems to be evidenced, for example, by parents’ hard work aimed to 
improve their children’s prospects in life.”). 
94 Kelly, supra note 1, at 1148–49; see Fried, supra note 92, at 665 (explaining the 
same concept). 
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Even if the donor is not motivated by altruism but is instead motivated by self-
interest, freedom of inheritance likely increases social welfare. When self-interest 
drives the donor’s decision to give a testamentary gift, the donor receives benefit 
from the mere act of giving and not necessarily from the increased utility that the 
donee experiences as a result of the gift.95 The utility of the donor is not tied to the 
utility of the donee.96 In this situation, freedom of inheritance allows the donee to 
maximize her utility by choosing which transfers from the donor’s estate positively 
affect her well-being.97 At the same time, the donee’s option to reject the gift likely 
does not decrease the donor’s utility because the disclaimed property will be 
distributed to an alternate donee. 98  The donor still receives the satisfaction of 
knowing that she is making a gift even if the identity of the donee might change. 
Thus, when the donor is motivated by self-interest, freedom of inheritance 
maximizes social welfare because the donor’s utility is maximized and the donor’s 
utility likely is unaffected. 
A third potential motivation underlying the donor’s decision to make a 
testamentary gift is that the donor feels obligated to make the transfer. Under this 
scenario, the donor’s transfer is not necessarily donative in nature but is instead part 
of an exchange with the donee.99 As Professor Barbara Fried explains,  
 
The implicit contract hypothesized under the exchange motive theory 
assumes that the donor pays on the honor system for services rendered: 
Kids care for their aging parents for years, in exchange for an implicit 
promise from their parents to pay for their services on a deferred basis at 
the parents’ death.100  
 
Within this context, the donee’s freedom of inheritance does not reduce the donor’s 
utility because she receives the benefit of the implicit bargain regardless of whether 
the donee accepts or rejects a transfer from her estate. Indeed, if the donor is solely 
motivated by a perceived obligation to reciprocate a benefit conferred by the donee, 
the donor should be indifferent to whether the donor disclaims an interest in her 
																																								 																				
95 See Kaplow, supra note 92, at 176–77 (“Another motivation is that donors obtain 
pleasure not from the enhancement in their donees’ well-being but rather from the fact that 
they, the donors themselves, have made the gift. That is, they get utility from giving per se.”); 
Kelly, supra note 1, at 1148 (“If the happiness is related to mere self-interest, a donor obtains 
satisfaction from the act of giving itself.”). 
96 See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 58 (“[T]he act of giving itself may supply utility to 
the donor, independently of the degree of satisfaction it renders the donee.”). 
97 See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
98 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
99 See Kaplow, supra note 92, at 177 (“Another important possibility is that transfers 
are not true gifts but really only one side of an exchange transaction. For example, parents 
may give more to children as implicit or explicit compensation for services, such as in 
providing care and attention.”); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1148 (“Other types of self-interested 
giving may be based on exchange or reciprocity.”). 
100 Fried, supra note 92, at 652. 
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estate. Therefore, because the option to reject a transfer increases the donee’s utility 
but does not decrease the donor’s utility,101 and may in fact increase the donor’s 
utility,102 freedom of inheritance maximizes social welfare. 
 
3.  Moral Hazard 
 
In addition to increasing the individual utility of both the donor and the donee, 
freedom of inheritance maximizes social welfare by allowing the donee to engage 
in postmortem estate planning.103 By providing the donee discretion to accept or 
reject a transfer from the donor’s estate, the law allows the donee to make decisions 
regarding the ultimate distribution of the donor’s property. To be sure, the donee 
cannot select who receives the disclaimed property; instead, the donee who would 
have taken the property had the disclaiming donee predeceased the donor enjoys the 
benefit of the transfer.104 The donee does not select the alternate taker, but she does 
make the decision whether to accept the transfer, thereby withholding the property 
from the alternate taker, or to reject the transfer, thereby benefitting the alternate 
taker rather than herself. In this way, the donee can make decisions regarding the 
donor’s property that amount to estate planning after the donor’s death. 
As explained previously, the law presumes that the donor is in the best position 
to evaluate the utility of particular transfers and therefore generally relies upon the 
donor to make decisions regarding her estate plan.105 Why then should the law not 
unquestionably honor the donor’s decisions regarding the disposition of her 
property? Put differently, why should the law allow the donee to second-guess the 
donor’s exercise of freedom of disposition by granting her the ability to engage in 
postmortem estate planning? The answer to these questions is that, although the 
donor is in the best position to make decisions regarding her estate, there is no 
guarantee that she will actually make rational, informed decisions.106 As Hirsch and 
Wang explain, “[T]he assumption that [donors] will in general use freedom of 
[disposition] to craft thoughtful schemes of distribution is not 
unproblematic . . . . [The donor] may know best; but, alas, we have no assurance that 
in practice he will do what is best.”107 
As such, the rationale behind allowing the donee to engage in postmortem 
estate planning is that, under certain circumstances, an estate plan is defective. As 
Professor Joan Ellsworth explains, “Sometimes pre-death planning for a decedent’s 
estate is nonexistent, poorly done, antiquated and out-of-date, or unfair in the 
																																								 																				
101 See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra notes 80–91 and accompanying text. 
103 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140 (“Disclaimers allow for post-
mortem estate planning.”). 
104 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
105 See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
106 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1138 (“Effectuating a donor’s ex ante interests is not 
necessarily equivalent to maximizing social welfare.”). 
107 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13. 
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opinion of the surviving family members.”108 Freedom of inheritance allows the 
donee to minimize the effect of these problems by tweaking the donor’s estate 
plan.109 While the recognition that a donor does not always exercise her freedom of 
disposition so as to increase social welfare explains why the law allows the donee to 
engage in postmortem estate planning. It also raises the question of why the donor 
might not make optimal decisions regarding the disposition of her estate.  
One explanation of why the donor does not always make the best choices 
regarding the distribution of her property upon death is that she will not bear the 
costs of poor decisions.110 Because the donor will be dead at the time her decisions 
take effect, she will not be present for the aftermath of her ineffective estate plan. If 
her decisions produce results that are unfair or inefficient, she will not have to 
observe her family and friends deal with the consequences of her actions. She will 
not experience the frustration and disappointment of the people whom her decisions 
effect,111 and she will not feel the regret of knowing that she could have avoided 
many of the problems flowing from her defective estate plan through proper 
planning. Because she will not bear the costs of her poor estate planning, the donor 
has less incentive to make thoughtful decisions and plan accordingly.112 
This situation in which a decision-maker is shielded from the costs of her 
decisions is known as a moral hazard.113 The paradigmatic example of a moral 
																																								 																				
108 Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 695; see Hirsch, supra note 59, at 156 n.218 (“[I]n a 
surprising number of cases — a beneficiary may seek to bring about a distribution that better 
accords with her understanding of what the testator wished but failed to accomplish, due to 
intestacy or a failure to update the will.”). 
109 See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1884 (“As a form of postmortem estate planning, 
disclaimers preserve for poorly advised benefactors opportunities that their better-advised 
counterparts already enjoy, effectively correcting the will retroactively.”); Hirsch, supra note 
59, at 157–58 (“Execution of a disclaimer serves to cure a defective estate plan; and, 
inevitably, the likelihood of poor estate planning increases in inverse proportion to the wealth 
of the benefactor.”). 
110  See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of 
Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1294 
(1999) (“If we cede to the dead the power to tell the living what to do with material resources 
(that is, if we grant the right of testation), we encounter the obvious moral hazard problems 
that arise whenever an actor knows that she will suffer no consequences from her actions.”); 
see also David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 102 (2012) (“[T]he 
consequence-free nature of testation creates a risk of moral hazard.”). 
111 See Harry Hibschman, Whimsies of Will-Makers, 66 U.S. L. REV. 362, 362 (1932) 
(“[A] will is a man’s one sure chance to have the last word. In it he can vent his spite in 
safety without his victims having a chance to answer back.”). 
112 See David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 572 (2014) (explaining 
that “the dead do not experience the consequences of their decisions” and consequently there 
is “the fear that people act less soberly in making decisions that will take effect only after 
their demise”). 
113 See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISES OF 
2008 63 (2009) (explaining that “the term,” moral hazard “refer[s] to any situation in which 
one person makes decisions about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost 
if things go badly”). 
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hazard problem involves insurance.114 For instance, when an individual purchases a 
home, she is likely concerned about the possibility of loss due to fire. Consequently, 
she has an incentive to take precautions to minimize the risk of fire, such as 
purchasing a fire extinguisher or being careful when she uses the fireplace to heat 
her home. Above and beyond these precautions, the homeowner may also purchase 
insurance to protect against potential loss due to fire. The insurance provides the 
homeowner peace of mind that she will be compensated if her house burns down, 
but it also reduces her incentive to be vigilant against the risk of fire.115 Knowing 
that she will not bear the cost of replacing her home if a fire occurs, she may be less 
concerned about having a fire extinguisher on hand or less careful when using the 
fireplace. 116  In this way, fire insurance creates a moral hazard because the 
homeowner has less incentive to protect against the risk of loss. 
To understand how the moral hazard problem arises in the context of estate 
planning, contrast the cost of bad estate planning decisions with the cost of bad 
lifetime donative decisions. If a donor makes poor choices regarding how to transfer 
property during life, she will suffer the negative consequences of those choices.117 
She will see the imprudent donee squander her gifts. She will observe the individual 
whom she chose not to benefit, struggle financially. She will bear the unhappiness 
and frustration of disappointed individuals who did not benefit from her generosity. 
These potential costs of poor decision-making serve as a check on the lifetime donor 
and provide her an incentive to think carefully about her donative decisions. These 
costs, however, do not affect the donor who plans for the disposition of property 
upon death. As Hirsch explains, “[A] testator may lack incentives at death to 
distribute efficiently the assets he has amassed during life.”118 This is true because 
“[w]hen persons act during their lifetimes, they must live with the consequences. 
But persons acting at the moment of death, quite literally, do not: They are free to 
																																								 																				
114 Id. at 62 (“The term ‘moral hazard’ has its origins in the insurance industry. Very 
early in the game providers of fire insurance, in particular, noticed that property owners who 
were fully insured against loss had an interesting tendency to have destructive fires.”). 
115 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 537 (1986) (“To the extent that insurance covers losses, actors have less incentive to 
avoid them, either by taking actions that diminish the probability of loss or by behaving in 
manner that reduces the amount of loss.”); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a 
Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer’s Guide to Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1671–72 (1974) (“The owner of insurance tends to behavior in a way 
which increases the probability and magnitude of the adverse event against which he is 
insuring himself.”). 
116 See Kaplow, supra note 115, at 537 (“Fire insurance illustrates [the problem of 
moral hazard]: full, unconditional coverage diminishes incentives to install costly fire 
protection devices.”); Polinsky, supra note 115, at 1672 (“[A] homeowner with fire insurance 
is less likely to buy fire resistant rugs or curtains, install a home sprinkler system, or dispose 
of his oil-soaked rags.”). 
117 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13 (“Living persons suffer the consequences 
that follow their actions.”). 
118 Hirsch, supra note 7, at 639; see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13 (“[A] testator 
may . . . lack inhibitions at death that tempered her course of conduct during life.”). 
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act ‘irresponsibly’ without paying any of the economic or interpersonal costs that 
living persons must bear for such behavior.”119 This consequence of estate planning 
has been referred to as the “moral hazard of testation.”120 
Thus, the same disincentives that insurance creates for the homeowner are 
created by the death of the donor. Under both scenarios, the decision-maker has less 
incentive to make appropriate choices because she will not bear the cost of poor 
decisions. The homeowner might not take proper precautions because she will not 
bear the cost of repairing or rebuilding her home. Likewise, the donor might not 
exercise her freedom of disposition with adequate thought and careful deliberation 
because she will be dead at the time her decisions take effect. The careless exercise 
of freedom of disposition can result in an estate plan that is suboptimal from a social 
welfare perspective. Without proper reflection, the donor might not consider how 
best to distribute her property or she might inaccurately assess the utility that her 
estate plan produces. Therefore, in part because the donor’s decision-making process 
is distorted by the moral hazard of testation, the law allows the donee to question the 
decisions that the donor has made. Indeed, the donee’s ability to assess the donor’s 
decisions and to disclaim property if alternate donees would receive greater utility 
from particular transfers allows the donee to increase the social welfare efficiency 
of the donor’s estate plan.  
 
4.  Imperfect Information 
 
In addition to alleviating the moral hazard problem that results from the donor 
making decisions that will take effect only after she dies,121  postmortem estate 
planning through the exercise of freedom of inheritance maximizes social welfare 
by addressing issues of imperfect information. As just mentioned, the law relies 
upon the donor to make decisions regarding her estate plan because she likely has 
the best information to make such decisions.122 However, because the donor makes 
estate planning decisions during her lifetime that do not become effective until after 
she dies, she sometimes makes these decisions without all the relevant information 
regarding the needs of her friends and family.123 When the donor exercises freedom 
																																								 																				
119 Hirsch, supra note 7, at 639; see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13. 
120 E.g., Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13; Hirsch, supra note 7, at 639; Horton, 
supra note 112, at 572. 
121 See supra Part II.B.3. 
122 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136. 
123 See Richard C. Ausness, Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand: The 
Modification and Termination of “Irrevocable” Trusts, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 237, 295 
(2015) (“According to one school of thought, imperfect information, particularly about future 
events and circumstances, may cause donors to make disposition of their property that they 
would not have made had they been better prognosticators. Unfortunately, once the donor is 
dead, such decisions cannot be reversed.”). 
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of disposition with imperfect information, she might craft an estate plan that is 
suboptimal from a social welfare perspective.124  
Two specific examples of this general scenario illustrate the problem of 
imperfect information and the role that freedom of inheritance plays in postmortem 
estate planning. The first involves an insolvent donee.125 Imagine a situation in 
which the donor directs a gift to a donee who has amassed significant debts. If, under 
this scenario, the donee could not disclaim the transfer, the donee’s creditors would 
benefit from the transfer rather than the donee herself. 126  From the donee’s 
perspective, the transfer might have greater utility when it is disclaimed and benefits 
an alternate donee, who is likely a close family member,127 rather than when it is 
accepted and ultimately flows to the donee’s creditors.128 Certainly, the donee would 
receive the benefit of at least partially extinguishing her debts if she were to accept 
the transfer, but the same result is available to her through bankruptcy.129 Therefore, 
if the donee considers the alternate donee’s welfare, she would choose to disclaim 
the transfer if the alternate donee’s increased utility is greater than her utility from 
foregoing bankruptcy. 
																																								 																				
124  See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1158 (“Future events are difficult to foresee and 
unanticipated contingencies may arise. As a result, a donor may dispose of property in a way 
that contradicts what the donor would have wanted with complete information.”); see also 
David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1703 
(2009) (“Even the savviest investor cannot predict how to allocate assets efficiently in the 
distant future.”). A donee’s mere willingness to disclaim a transfer from the donor’s estate, 
suggests that the donor crafted her estate plan without the necessary information to make 
informed decisions regarding the disposition of her property. See Reid Kress Weisbord, 
Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and Unanticipated Circumstances, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 1931, 1936 (2014) (“Had the donor known of the circumstances causing the original 
beneficiary to disclaim, the donor presumably would have skipped the original beneficiary 
altogether in favor of the next eligible beneficiary.”). 
125 See generally Hirsch, supra note 7. 
126  See Parker, supra note 88, at 32 (“[I]f the law did not allow disclaimers, the 
testator’s property could end up in the hands of the devisee’s creditors, thus clearly 
frustrating the testator’s intent.”). 
127 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 116 (“By consulting the will or the intestacy statute, a 
beneficiary can predetermine who will take in her place should she choose to disclaim—
often a close relative.”). 
128 See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 632 (“A beneficiary who anticipates bankruptcy or a 
workout may be able to improve his position by disclaiming (and thereby preserving for his 
relatives or for surreptitious personal enjoyment) property that would otherwise go to satisfy 
his debts that will be discharged or forgiven away.”). But see Weisbord, supra note 124, at 
1936 n.22 (“[A]n insolvent beneficiary might not disclaim if the next to take is not a close 
relative. From the insolvent beneficiary’s perspective, it would be better to retain the 
inheritance to repay creditors than to allow it to pass to an unrelated their party.”). 
129  See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1909 (“[T]he petition for relief in bankruptcy 
ordinarily marks the ‘line of cleavage’ between prepetition accumulations of property that 
the debtor must surrender to creditors and postpetition accumulations that a discharged 
debtor gets to keep as his or her ‘fresh start’ . . . .”). 
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Likewise, from the donor’s perspective, a disclaimer by the insolvent donee 
likely increases the utility of the transfer because the donor’s probable intent is 
fulfilled.130 As Hirsch explains,  
 
[T]he disclaimer fulfills the implicit intent of the benefactor, at least in 
those instances where the amount of the inheritance does not dwarf the 
debt. Few benefactors would want their savings to go [to] a beneficiary’s 
creditors, given that the beneficiary can seek a discharge of his or her debts 
in bankruptcy, extinguishing them otherwise.131  
 
Put differently, if presented this situation at the time she crafted her estate plan, the 
donor would have undertaken a comparative analysis of the utility that the primary 
donee would receive from the transfer and the utility that the alternate taker would 
receive from the transfer, and she likely would have concluded that the alternate 
donee should receive the transfer rather the primary donee’s creditors.132  
Because the donor likely would not want her property to end up in the hands of 
a donee’s creditors,133 a donor who directs property to an insolvent donee likely 
possessed imperfect information at the time she crafted her estate plan. Either the 
donor did not know that the donee was insolvent at the time she made her decisions 
regarding her estate, or the donee was solvent at the time the donor crafted her estate 
plan but subsequently amassed significant debts. Under either scenario, the donor 
did not possess all relevant information necessary to craft her estate plan, and 
consequently the law allows the donee to disclaim her interest in the donor’s estate 
as a way to address this problem of imperfect information. 
The second specific scenario in which the donor might inaccurately predict the 
utility of a transfer because of the problem of imperfect information involves taxes. 
Imagine a scenario in which the donor dies leaving behind a will that gives her entire 
estate to her daughter A or, if A predeceases her, to A’s daughter, B.134 A is well off 
																																								 																				
130 See Bender, supra note 78, at 898 (“The goal behind such a disclaimer is to avoid 
frustrating the wishes of the testator because of the beneficiary’s outstanding obligations.”); 
Hirsch, supra note 7, at 632 (“Along with the intent of the beneficiary, one has also to 
consider the intent of the benefactor. Several opinions defend the right of insolvent 
disclaimer on the ground that to compel acceptance would violate the ‘probable intent’ of 
the testator, who ‘sought to benefit the distributee and not a public or private creditor.’ In 
order to carry out the benefactor’s probable intent, the beneficiary’s right of disclaimer must 
be assured.”). 
131 Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1884. 
132 But see Bender, supra note 78, at 901 (“[I]t is no less likely that a testator intends to 
help the devisee pay off debts and begin anew.”); Hirsch, supra note 7, at 632 (“Conceivably, 
some patriarchs might see the matter differently. They might specifically intend that their 
legacies be used to stave bankruptcy, whether to avoid the resulting family stigma or simply 
out of ‘old-time conscientiousness.”). 
133 See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
134 This is a variant of a simple example. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 
141. However, tax consequences can influence the donee’s decision to disclaim in more 
complex situations. See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 709–10.  
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and would prefer that B, who is young and not as financially secure, take the donor’s 
estate instead. One option to accomplish this result is for A to accept the transfer 
from the donor and then to make a separate transfer to B. Another option is for A to 
disclaim the transfer in which case she will be treated as predeceasing the donor and 
B will take in her place. In this situation, the tax consequences of each scenario might 
affect A’s decision to accept or to reject the transfer from the donor.135 
The transfer of wealth is subject to federal taxation, and A’s two options for 
directing the donor’s estate to B have different tax consequences. If A chooses the 
first option and accepts the donor’s estate, this initial transfer between the donor and 
A is subject to federal wealth transfer taxes; likewise, the secondary transfer between 
A and B will also be taxed.136 Thus, A’s acceptance of the donor’s estate ultimately 
produces two taxable transfers. By contrast, if A chooses the second option and 
disclaims the transfer from the donor, federal tax laws will treat the scenario as 
producing only one taxable transfer.137 In this situation, the law views the estate as 
passing from the donor directly to B, and therefore, instead of being taxed twice, the 
transfer of the donor’s property is only taxed once.138 Therefore, under both options, 
the donor’s estate ends up in the hands of B, but A’s disclaimer of the transfer is 
more efficient because it produces less tax liability than a separate transfer from A 
to B.139 
When the donor leaves behind an estate plan that is inefficient from a tax 
perspective, there is a strong indication that the donor did not know the tax 
implications of the disposition of her property.140 Perhaps tax laws changed in the 
time intervening the preparation of her estate plan and her death in ways that 
																																								 																				
135 See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 710 (explaining that even if “the amount of . . . tax 
imposed . . . is insubstantial,” tax liability can influence the donee’s decision to disclaim 
because “any amount of tax is important to family members”). 
136 See id. at 695–96 (“[A] valid disclaimer results in one gratuitous transfer (from the 
transferor to the substituted taker) while an invalid disclaimer, or no disclaimer, may 
occasion two transfers (from the transferor to the would-be disclaimant, and then from the 
disclaimant to the substituted taker).”). 
137 See I.R.C. § 2518(a) (West 2016) (“[I]f a person makes a qualified disclaimer with 
respect to any interest in property, this subtitle shall apply with respect to such interest as if 
the interest had never been transferred to such person.”). 
138 To avoid federal transfer tax liability in this situation, the disclaimer must be made 
within a specified timeframe. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 141–42 (“To 
qualify under the federal tax code, the disclaimer must be made within nine months after the 
interest is created or after the donee reaches 21, whichever is later.”). 
139 See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 629 (“The most common modern inducement for 
disclaimer is family wealth planning.” By disclaiming, the donee “may succeed in skipping 
a generation’s worth of inheritance taxes.”); Hirsch, supra note 59, at 116 (“Assuming [the 
donee] has ties of benevolence to [the alternate donee], she may calculate that a direct transfer 
from the benefactor to that alternative beneficiary, accomplished via a disclaimer, is from 
the standpoint of the family as a whole more tax efficient than, and possibly therefore 
preferable to, the transfer that would otherwise occur from the benefactor to herself.”). 
140 See Weisbord, supra note 124, at 1935–36. 
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rendered her estate plan inefficient.141 Even if the donor knew or could have known 
of changes in the tax laws, the donor cannot know everything necessary to craft an 
efficient estate plan. As Ellsworth explains, “[t]wo important factors [that affect the 
tax efficiency of an estate plan] can never be known with certainty before a taxable 
transfer occurs: the timing of an individual’s death and the final value of a 
transferor’s estate.”142 She argues that “hindsight is a valuable tool” to address this 
inherent uncertainty of estate planning and that the right to disclaim “gives family 
members and personal representatives the flexibility they need to take full advantage 
of various beneficial provisions in state and federal tax laws.”143 
Thus, freedom of inheritance can be seen as a safeguard against the donor’s 
exercise of freedom of disposition with imperfect information. Because, at the time 
she crafts her estate plan, the donor cannot perfectly assess the ultimate utility of a 
transfer from her estate, the law allows the donee to reassess the transfer after the 
donor’s death. Put simply, the donee has better information, and consequently, the 
law allows the donee to adjust the donor’s estate plan to account for this better 
information.144 With the benefit of hindsight, the donee can increase the utility of 
the transfer, and therefore, freedom of inheritance can be seen as a tool to maximize 
social welfare.  
 
5.  Transaction Costs 
 
In addition to addressing problems of moral hazard and imperfect 
information, 145  postmortem estate planning through the exercise of freedom of 
inheritance can reduce transaction costs. Imperfect information may render an estate 
plan ineffective because the donor might simply not know all the relevant 
considerations to accurately assess the utility of particular transfers.146 However, an 
estate plan can be defective even when the donor possesses perfect information. For 
example, a donor might be aware that a donee is insolvent, and she might recognize 
that a transfer to an alternate taker would produce greater utility because the 
transferred property would not be used to satisfy the donee’s debts. Nevertheless, 
																																								 																				
141 See Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 712 (“Changes in the tax laws may also necessitate 
a disclaimer. A dispositive instrument is drafted based on existing conditions, and it cannot 
reflect laws enacted after its execution.”).   
142 Id. at 713 (suggesting that the problem of imperfect information can affect the 
donor’s ability “to maximize the benefit from such tax-saving techniques as equalizing 
spouses’ estates, adopting the alternate valuation date or utilizing the credit for tax on prior 
transfers.”). 
143 Id. 
144 See Weisbord, supra note 124, at 1935–36 (“Because most donors want to achieve 
efficient estate planning and protect their estates from collection by tax authorities and 
creditors, we presume a donor with full knowledge of the relevant circumstances at death 
would approve of or, more likely, prefer the beneficiary’s decision to disclaim rather take.”). 
145 See supra Parts II.B.3–4. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 124–143. 
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the donor might not implement this change and direct the transfer away from the 
insolvent donee because she might incur transaction costs to do so.147 
The donor’s act of changing her estate plan involves the time and effort of 
executing a will or other donative document that reflects her new intent. 148 
Oftentimes, this act also involves consultation with a lawyer,149 which has monetary 
costs. The time, money, and effort of implementing a change to the donor’s estate 
plan, represent the transaction costs of the donor’s decision to redirect a transfer in 
a way that produces greater utility,150 such as by directing a transfer away from an 
insolvent donee and to an alternate taker. In addition to transaction costs in the form 
of time and money, the act of changing an estate plan has psychological costs.151 
The donor must confront her own mortality when making decisions regarding the 
disposition of her property upon death,152 and consequently, estate planning can 
produce fear, anxiety, and other negative psychological and emotional 
consequences.153 
Therefore, even if the donor has perfect information with which to assess the 
utility of different transfers, she might not change her estate plan to implement 
transfers of higher utility. When making her decision, she will weigh the transaction 
costs of changing her estate plan with the benefit of the new transfer. If the increased 
																																								 																				
147 See Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous Transfers and Contractual Transfers: 
A Situational Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 834 n.182 (2014) (explaining that 
“transaction costs impede” the amendment of wills); Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (2012) (suggesting that there are “transaction cost[s] of executing 
a will”). 
148 See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of its 
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1039 (2004) (“For contractual theorists, default rules 
serve to minimize the expense of bargaining. Gratuitous transfers do not ordinarily involve 
bargaining, to be exact, but they do entail drafting and formalization, in the form of a will.”). 
149 See Schenkel, supra note 10, at 179 (“The public in general perceives the will as a 
document that is formally technical enough that many people, if not most, seek the services 
of a lawyer in having one drawn up.”). 
150 See Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747, 837 (2015) 
(explaining that estate planning “entails transaction costs, including estate planning lawyers 
and a significant time investment”); Weisbord, supra note 2, at 879 (“[T]he complexity of 
the will-making process deters the exercise of testamentary freedom by imposing substantial 
transaction costs, including the cost of professional counsel or the investment of time 
necessary to prepare a proper will . . . .”). 
151  See Hirsch, supra note 148, at 1050 (“[P]sychological barriers accompany 
transaction costs, conspiring to impede the testamentary process.”); see also Mark Glover, 
The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 139, 145 (2012) 
(explaining that the “antitherapeutic consequences” of estate planning “may dissuade the 
testator from completing her estate plan and may impair the testator’s decision-making 
capabilities”). 
152 See Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-in Will Forms – The First Decade: Theoretical 
Constructs and Empirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 778 (1993) (“Many persons are 
intellectually aware that estate planning is necessary, but find it emotionally difficult to 
confront the fragility of life and health.”). 
153 See Glover, supra note 7, at 434–38; Hirsch, supra note 148, at 1047–50. 
308 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
utility of the new transfer outweighs her transaction costs, she will change her estate 
plan. Conversely, if the transaction costs outweigh the increased utility of the 
alternate transfer, the donor will not make the change. Her estate plan will remain 
as is, and the higher utility transfer will not occur. The transaction costs associated 
with implementing an estate plan therefore may prevent the donor from distributing 
her property in a way that maximizes social welfare. 
In part to address this issue, the law grants the donee freedom of inheritance. 
Indeed, postmortem estate planning can be seen as a mechanism that reduces the 
transactions costs of directing the donor’s property in ways that increase the overall 
utility of her estate plan. Allowing the donee to adjust the donor’s estate plan through 
the exercise of freedom of inheritance can reduce transaction costs in two ways. 
First, postmortem estate planning can reduce transaction costs because the costs 
borne by the donee after donor’s death are likely smaller than the costs borne by the 
donor during life. The focus of a disclaimer is narrow, encompassing only the 
particular property flowing to the donee.154 By contrast, the focus of a will is much 
broader, involving not only the disposition of potentially all of the donor’s property 
but also other issues, such as the appointment of executors and guardians of minor 
children. 155  Because of a will’s greater complexity and broader scope, the 
preparation of a disclaimer likely involves less time, effort, and money than the 
planning, drafting, and execution of a will.156 
Additionally, the donee’s transaction costs are likely smaller than the donor’s 
because postmortem estate planning minimizes the psychological toll of estate 
planning. The donor’s act of estate planning forces her to acknowledge the 
inevitability of death and therefore can produce negative psychological 
consequences.157 By contrast, to undertake postmortem estate planning, the donee 
must not confront her own mortality. Instead, the donee must simply make a decision 
regarding the disposition of the donor’s property. To be sure, the donee must make 
these decisions during a time when she might still be mourning the loss of a loved 
																																								 																				
154 See supra text accompanying notes 58–65. 
155 See Percy Bordwell, Testamentary Dispositions, 19 KY. L.J. 283, 283 (1931) (“A 
will may be defined as the means whereby one disposes of his property at his death or 
appoints an executor or a guardian for his orphan child or does any combination of these 
things.”). 
156 The donor may be able to reduce transaction costs by narrowly altering an estate 
plan through the execution of a codicil that amends a preexisting will. See Adam J. Hirsch, 
Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 614 
(2009) (“Ordinarily, amending a will by codicil is simple and inexpensive . . . .”). However, 
the transaction costs of a codicil may still prevent the donor from updating her estate plan. 
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13 (“Wills frequently mature years after they are 
executed, and the costs (both economic and psychological) of adding codicils may deter 
testators from updating estate plans to take into account changed circumstances. Estate plans 
become increasingly stale as time passes, and due to human inertia they tend to remain so.”). 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 151–153. 
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one.158  However, the psychological and emotional consequences that the donee 
endures as a result of the donor’s death occur whether or not she considers the utility 
of postmortem estate planning. Postmortem estate planning may add to these 
negative effects,159 but this additional stress and anxiety is likely less than the donor 
experiences as a result of estate planning during life.160 
Not only does postmortem estate planning likely reduce the transaction costs 
of a single act of estate planning, but it also decreases the need to undertake multiple 
acts of estate planning. In order for the donor to ensure that her estate plan is up-to-
date, she must continuously amend her estate plan as circumstances change over the 
course of her life.161 Each time she does, she incurs transaction costs, which can 
accumulate the longer that she lives and the more circumstances change. By contrast, 
the donee exercises freedom of inheritance after the donor’s death. Circumstances 
affecting the utility of the donor’s estate plan are not in flux when the donee assesses 
the utility of the transfer from the donor’s estate,162 and consequently the donee must 
bear the transaction costs of exercising her freedom of inheritance only once. The 
donee’s single postmortem estate planning experience therefore likely produces 
fewer overall transaction costs than the successive line of estate planning events that 
the donor must undertake to ensure that her estate plan reflects current 
circumstances. 
In sum, the donor’s freedom of inheritance can be explained as a component of 
the law of succession that maximizes social welfare. It accomplishes this goal in 
various ways. First, the discretion to accept or to reject a transfer from the donor’s 
estate increases the donee’s utility.163 In particular, freedom of inheritance allows 
the donee to independently assess the utility of a transfer and to accept only those 
transfers that she perceives to be worthwhile. If the donee determines that a transfer 
from the donor’s estate would actually produce negative utility, she can reject the 
transfer. Second, the donee’s freedom of inheritance can increase the donor’s 
																																								 																				
158 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 153 n.209 (“[D]isclaimers are contemplated at a time 
when the beneficiary is often gripped with emotions – in this case, grief brought on by her 
benefactor’s death, or even feelings of guilt over receiving the inheritance . . . .”). 
159 Any involvement that the donee has in the administration of the donor’s estate can 
produce stress and anxiety during the grieving process. See Glover, supra note 7, at 442. 
However, the ability to engage in postmortem estate planning may actually reduce the 
donee’s emotional toll because she can take comfort in knowing that her actions aided in the 
efficient distribution of the donor’s estate. 
160 But see Hirsch, supra note 59, at 153 n.209 (suggesting that the donee’s emotional 
discomfort is “at least as powerful as [that] experienced by the prospective donor of a gift.”).  
161 See Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157, 173 (Ohio 1862) (“[T]he circumstances of 
a testator, and the character, fortunes and wants of the natural objects of his bounty, are 
subject to constant change. To-day a testator makes his will; to-morrow a daughter is 
widowed, or a son is crippled; and so, what would be reasonable in a will to-day, becomes 
unreasonable by the accident of to-morrow.”).  
162 The idea that changed circumstances are not a concern after the donor’s death is 
related to the notion that the donee may have better information regarding the utility of the 
donor’s estate plan after the donor’s death. See supra notes 122–143 and accompany text. 
163 See supra Part II.B.1. 
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utility.164 The donor’s utility is frequently tied to the donee’s utility, so that the 
donor’s utility increases when the donee’s utility increases. Consequently, the 
donee’s ability to reject transfers that she determines to be detrimental may increase 
the donor’s utility because the donor has assurance that a transfer from her estate 
will in fact benefit the donee. Finally, freedom of inheritance allows the donee to 
undertake postmortem estate planning.165 The donee’s ability to adjust the donor’s 
estate plan after the donor’s death addresses problems of moral hazard, imperfect 
information, and transaction costs. 
 
III.  FACILITATING THE FREEDOM 
 
Freedom of disposition is the fundamental principle of the modern law of 
succession because it is viewed as maximizing social welfare.166 Therefore, the 
law’s primary goal is to promote the donor’s exercise of this freedom by carrying 
out her intended estate plan.167 As the Restatement explains, “The main function of 
the law in this field is to facilitate rather than regulate. The law serves this function 
by establishing rules under which sufficiently reliable determinations can be made 
regarding the content of the donor’s intention.”168 As the previous section argued, 
																																								 																				
164 See supra Part II.B.2. 
165 See supra Part II.B.3–5. 
166 See supra Part I. 
167  See Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against 
Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 96 (2006) (“The primary goal of the American law 
of wills is the effectuation of the decedent’s testamentary intent.”); Ashbel G. Gulliver & 
Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1941) (“One 
fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the individualistic 
institution of private property and granting to the owner the power to determine his 
successors in ownership, the general philosophy of courts should favor giving effect to an 
intentional exercise of that power.”); Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: 
Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 553 n.1 (1999) (“Most 
scholars agree that giving effect to testamentary intent is the primary objective of wills 
law.”). 
168 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003); see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-102 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) (stating that one of the “underlying purposes and policies” of 
the law of succession is “to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in 
distribution of his property”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“This section implements this fundamental 
principle by stating two well-accepted propositions: (1) that the controlling consideration in 
determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention; and (2) that the 
donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”); see also 
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 1 (“Most of the law of succession is concerned 
with enabling posthumous enforcement of the actual intent of the decedent or, failing this, 
giving effect to the decedent’s probable intent.”); Weisbord, supra note 2, at 877–78 (“The 
polestar of American inheritance law, testamentary freedom is a right protected by the U.S. 
Constitution, and once it is exercised, courts go to great lengths to implement the decedent’s 
intent by closely honoring and interpreting testamentary instructions.”). Although the term 
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freedom of inheritance also plays an important role in maximizing social welfare.169 
As such, just as the law facilitates the donor’s exercise of freedom of disposition, 
the law should also strive to facilitate the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance. 
This section therefore analyzes how the law should facilitate the donee’s exercise of 
this freedom, and it does so by placing the law’s facilitative goal squarely within the 
social welfare model developed in previous sections of this Article. Specifically, this 
section examines three primary areas in which the law can facilitate freedom of 
inheritance, including (A) the process by which the donee exercises her freedom, 
(B) the timeframe during which the donee must make her decision whether to accept 
or to reject a transfer from the donor, and (C) the restrictions that the law places on 
the donee’s freedom.170 
 
A.  Formalization 
 
The law facilitates the exercise of freedom of disposition by providing a 
process through which the probate court can authenticate wills. If the court routinely 
validates inauthentic wills or conversely invalidates genuine wills, then freedom of 
disposition is undermined because the donor’s property is distributed in unintended 
ways.171 In turn, if property is distributed in unintended ways, then the social welfare 
benefits of freedom of disposition go unrealized. Traditionally, the law distinguishes 
authentic wills from inauthentic wills by requiring the donor to comply with a variety 
of will-execution formalities, such as the requirements that a will be written, signed, 
and witnessed.172 If the donor complies with these formalities, the court presumes 
																																								 																				
“testamentary intent” is commonly used to refer to the intent of the donor, the law is 
concerned with different types of intent in different contexts. See generally, Mark Glover, A 
Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 569, 581–99 (2016). 
169 See supra Part II. 
170 This is, of course, not an exhaustive list of potential areas in which the law could 
facilitate the exercise of freedom of inheritance. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Code Breakers: 
How States Are Modifying the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 46 REAL PROP. 
TR. & EST. L.J. 325, 326 (2011) (“[D]isclaimer statutes must answer any number of 
subsidiary questions: How long after a benefactor dies can a disclaimer occur; what 
formalities must a beneficiary who wishes to disclaim follow; who, if anyone, can disclaim 
on a beneficiary’s behalf; what events operate to bar a disclaimer; and what alternative 
devolution results from a disclaimer?”). For example, other areas in which the facilitative 
goal of the law should be explored include conditional disclaimers and ineffective 
disclaimers. See id. at 358–61. 
171 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 148 (explaining that “[b]oth kinds of 
error dishonor the decedent’s freedom of disposition” and that “[t]he former gives effect to 
a false expression of testamentary intent” while “the latter denies effect to a true expression 
of testamentary intent”); see generally Mark Glover, Probate-Error Costs, 49 CONN. L. REV. 
613 (2016). 
172  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 147–49; Mark Glover, Formal 
Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 
34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 423–25 (2009). 
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that she intended the will to be a legally effective expression of her estate plan, but 
if the donor does not comply, the court determines that the will is inauthentic.173  
Similarly, if the court makes incorrect determinations regarding whether the 
donee accepted or rejected a transfer from the donor’s estate, then the donee’s 
freedom of inheritance is undermined and the social welfare benefits of the freedom 
are lost. The law therefore provides the donee a process through which she can 
reliably exercise her discretion to accept or to reject a transfer from the donor’s 
estate.174 In this regard, the manner in which the donee exercises her freedom of 
inheritance is comparable to the process by which the donor exercises her freedom 
of disposition. Because most donees want to benefit from the donor’s estate,175 the 
law presumes that a donee will accept a transfer from the donor, and consequently, 
the donee must take some affirmative steps to reject the transfer.176 Similar to the 
formalities of will execution, the law requires the disclaimant to comply with certain 
formalities to exercise her discretion to reject an interest in the donor’s property.177 
For instance, all states require that the donee express her intent to disclaim a gift in 
a written document, 178  and most states also require the donee to sign the 
document.179 A small number of states require that the disclaimant comply with 
																																								 																				
173 When the decedent complies with the formalities of will execution, a rebuttable 
presumption of authenticity is triggered, meaning that the court will consider extrinsic 
evidence that suggests the decedent did not intend the will to be legally effective. See Mark 
Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 363–66 (2016) 
[hereinafter Glover, Probate-Error Risk]. By contrast, when the decedent does not comply 
with the formalities of will execution, a conclusive presumption of inauthenticity is triggered, 
meaning the court will not consider extrinsic evidence that suggests the decedent intended 
the will to be legally effective. See Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity of 
Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69, 97–98 (2014). 
174  See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT prefatory note (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) (explaining that “the new Act is an 
enabling statute”). 
175 See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1873. 
176  See In re Estate of Lyng, 608 N.W.2d 316, 319 (S.D. 2000) (“There exists a 
generally recognized presumption of the acceptance of a beneficial testamentary gift. 
Therefore, the renunciation of such a gift must be clear and unequivocal.”) (citations 
omitted); Tennant v. Satterfield, 216 S.E.2d 229, 231–32 (W. Va. 1975) (“The general rule 
with regard to acceptance of benefits under a will is that a beneficiary who accepts such 
benefits is bound to adopt the whole contents of that will and is estopped to challenge its 
validity. Acceptance of a beneficial legacy or transfer is presumed, but the presumption is 
rebuttable by express rejection of the benefits or by acts inconsistent with acceptance.”) 
(citation omitted). 
177 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149–54; Hirsch, supra note 170, at 361–62. 
178 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149. 
179 See id. at 149 n.187. These additional requirements are typically incorporated into 
disclaimer formalities through a requirement that a disclaimer be acknowledged in the 
manner required for the recordation of deeds. For example, the Florida disclaimer statute 
provides: “To be effective, a disclaimer must be in writing, declare the writing as a 
disclaimer, describe the interest or power disclaimed, and be signed by the person making 
the disclaimer and witnessed and acknowledged in the manner provided for deeds of real 
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additional formalities, such as notarization or attestation by witnesses.180 Moreover, 
in addition to formalizing a disclaimer in the prescribed manner, a donee must also 
deliver the disclaimer either to the probate court or to the donor’s personal 
representative.181 
In order to maximize social welfare, the law’s goal should be to facilitate not 
only the donor’s freedom of disposition but also the donee’s freedom of 
inheritance.182 As such, the formal processes that the donor and the donee must 
navigate would seem to contradict the law’s facilitative goal because they limit the 
manner in which the donor can exercise freedom of disposition and the donee can 
exercise freedom of inheritance. After all, some donors and donees might want to 
exercise their respective freedoms in other ways, such as by oral declaration,183 and 
requiring them to execute wills or to disclaim gifts in a prescribed manner would 
seem to restrict rather than facilitate the exercise of their freedoms. Because they 
limit the manner in which the donor can exercise freedom of disposition and the 
donee can exercise freedom of inheritance, the formalities for executing a will and 
disclaiming a gift should serve some purpose related to the maximization of social 
welfare.  
Within the context of will execution, the primary purpose of the prescribed 
formalities is to further the law’s facilitative goal by providing the court reliable 
evidence that the donor intended a will to be legally effective.184 Because a will takes 
effect only after the donor’s death, questions sometimes arise regarding whether the 
donor intended a particular document to constitute a legally effective will. 185 
																																								 																				
estate to be recorded in this state.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 739.104(3) (West 2017); see also 
C.G.S.A. § 45a-579(c) (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-1107 (West 2017); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 42-6-5(c) (West 2017). 
180 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149 n.187. 
181 See id. (“State statutes also mandate either that beneficiaries file a written disclaimer 
with the court, or that they deliver it to the personal representative, or they are permitted to 
do either, or they are required to do both.”). 
182 See supra Parts I.B. & II.B. 
183 Today, a minority of states recognizes oral wills as legally effective under very 
limited circumstances. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 148 n.3. Similarly, 
“[u]nder the common law, a beneficiary could effect a binding disclaimer by mere oral 
declaration.” Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149. 
184 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. 
a (AM. LAW INST. 2003); (“The formalities are meant to facilitate [an] intent-serving purpose, 
not to be ends in themselves.”); Champine, supra note 30, at 391–92 (“To facilitate 
realization of testamentary freedom, the law historically has required individuals to set forth 
dispositive desires in a written statement executed with formalities sufficient to identify to 
the individual executing the instrument and the world at large that the writing is intended to 
be a will.”). 
185 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 147 (“A will is a peculiar legal 
instrument . . . in that it does not take effect until after the testator dies. As a consequence, 
probate courts follow what has been called a ‘worst evidence’ rule of procedure. The witness 
who is best able to authenticate the will . . . is dead by the time the court considers such 
issues.”). 
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Consider, for example, a scenario in which a donor dies, and her family discovers a 
handwritten note folded between the pages of the donor’s diary.186 The document 
appears to describe how the donor wanted her property distributed upon death. But 
how can the court be sure that the donor wanted her property distributed in the 
manner described in the note? Perhaps the note is a rough draft that the donor had 
no confidence in to truly reflect what she wanted.187  Or perhaps the note was 
fraudulently prepared by someone attempting to benefit from the donor’s estate.188 
Because the donor is dead, the court cannot simply ask her whether she intended the 
document to be a legally effective expression of her estate plan.189 
To alleviate these evidentiary difficulties, the formal process of will execution 
provides courts an easy and efficient way to distinguish authentic wills from 
inauthentic wills. 190 Because most people would not go through the process of 
producing a written will, signing it, and having it witnessed without intending it to 
be legally effective, the donor’s compliance with the prescribed formalities provides 
robust evidence that she intended the will to govern the distribution of her estate.191 
Furthermore, the requirements that a will be written, signed, and witnessed, reduce 
the likelihood of fraud.192 Thus, when the donor complies with the formalities of will 
execution, the court can safely dispose of the donor’s estate according to the will’s 
terms with little risk that it is distributing property in an unintended manner.193 The 
primary purpose of will-execution formalities is therefore to ensure that the donor’s 
property is distributed according to the terms of a will that the donor intended to be 
legally effective,194 and, in this way, the formal process of will execution can be seen 
as serving the law’s overall facilitative goal. 
In addition to providing evidence that the donor intended a will to be legally 
effective, the formalities of will execution also serve the secondary function of 
cautioning the donor.195 As explained above, the law grants the donor broad freedom 
of disposition because she is in the best position to make decisions regarding the 
																																								 																				
186 This example is inspired by In re Estate of Rigsby, 843 P.2d 856, 857 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 1992). 
187 See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
597, 614 (2014).  
188 See id. at 617. 
189 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 167, at 4 (“These difficulties are entitled to 
especially serious consideration in prescribing requirements for gratuitous transfers, because 
the issue of the validity of the transfer is almost always raised after the alleged transferor is 
dead, and therefore the main actor is usually unavailable to testify, or to clarify or contradict 
other evidence concerning his all-important intention.”). 
190 See Glover, supra note 187, at 614–16. 
191 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 153. 
192 See Glover, supra note 187, at 617–18. 
193 See Glover, supra note 173, at 342–43. 
194 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. 
a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The purpose of statutory formalities . . . is to determine whether 
the decedent adopted the document as his or her will.”). 
195 See Glover, supra note 187, at 621–23. 
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distribution of her estate.196 However, even if the donor knows how best to distribute 
her property, she might not actually craft her estate plan in a way that maximizes 
social welfare.197 Because the donor’s decisions regarding the distribution of her 
estate take effect only after she dies, she will not bear the costs of poor choices.198 
This moral hazard of testation might cause the donor to not fully consider the 
consequences of her actions,199 and, in turn, she might execute a will haphazardly 
and without proper consideration.200 If the donor does not take the estate planning 
process seriously, she might not dispose of her estate in a way that maximizes social 
welfare. 
The formal process of will execution provides a check against the donor 
exercising freedom of disposition without adequate thought and proper preparation. 
By requiring the donor to produce a written will, the law forecloses the possibility 
that the donor will dispose of property through a haphazard oral declaration.201 
Likewise, the signature and witnessing requirements remind the donor that the act 
of testation has legal significance and consequently encourages the donor to 
seriously consider the consequences of her decisions.202 By transforming the will-
execution process into a ceremony, the law cautions the donor that she is making 
important decisions.203 Will-execution formalities therefore facilitate the exercise of 
freedom of disposition by attempting to at least partially alleviate the moral hazard 
concerns that arise because the donor will be dead at the time her decisions take 
effect.   
The formalities with which the donee must comply to disclaim a transfer serve 
similar functions as the formalities with which the donor must comply to execute a 
legally effective will.204 For instance, the formalities provide evidence of the donee’s 
																																								 																				
196 See supra Part I.B.2. 
197 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13. 
198 See Sherman, supra note 110, at 1294. 
199 See supra Part II.B.3. 
200 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13. 
201 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941) 
(explaining that the requirement of writing “induc[es] [a] circumspect frame of mind”); John 
H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1975) 
(“The requirement[] of writing . . . [is a] primary cautionary formalit[y]. Writing is somewhat 
less casual than plain chatter. As we say in a common figure of speech, ‘talk is cheap.’”). 
202  See Glover, supra note 187, at 622 (“[B]y introducing outsiders into the 
testamentary experience, the formality of attestation sets the execution of a will apart from 
ordinary transactions.”); John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of 
Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
3 (1987) (“Signature . . . caution[s] the testator about the seriousness and finality of his act.”). 
203 See C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: 
An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the 
Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 261–62 (1991) (“A secondary aspect 
of formality is its tendency to induce deliberation and reflection on the part of the testator. 
Formality thus prevents enforcement of casual statements and unpremeditated action . . . .”). 
204 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 151 (“As a matter of public policy, what degree of 
formality should the law require for a binding disclaimer? Our starting point for such an 
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intent to disclaim.205 When the donee expresses her intent to reject a transfer from 
the donor’s estate in writing and perhaps also complies with additional formalities,206 
the court has assurance that she actually intended to renounce the gift. More 
particularly, formal requirements for effective disclaimers limit the opportunity for 
fraud that would be present if the law did not prescribe a process through which the 
donee can effectively disclaim a gift.207 The Supreme Court of Virginia recognized 
this evidentiary function of formality in the context of both executing a will and 
disclaiming a gift when it explained, “The law requires wills to be executed with 
certain solemnities; and it would present a strange anomaly, if a devise, required to 
be in writing and executed with such solemnities, could be defeated, and in effect 
abrogated, by the testimony of a single witness proving some verbal disclaimer.”208 
Thus, the formal requirements for disclaiming a transfer are intended to prevent 
fraud and to provide robust evidence of the donee’s intent. 
Furthermore, like the donor’s decision-making process might be distorted by 
the moral hazard of testation,209  the donee’s decision-making process might be 
affected by what is known as the endowment effect.210 The endowment effect refers 
to the psychological phenomenon that people tend to value property that they 
possess more than equivalent property that they do not possess.211 As a result of the 
																																								 																				
analysis is the recognition that, in its substantive attributes, a disclaimer is itself a kind of 
gratuitous transfer . . . . Accordingly, the principles governing formalization of a gift would 
appear pertinent.”). 
205 See Hirsch, supra note 170, at 361 (explaining the formalities “ease the evidentiary 
task of determining whether a beneficiary intended a purported disclaimer as binding upon 
him or her”). 
206 See supra notes 177–83 and accompanying text. 
207 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 152 (“[I]f gifts required nothing beyond a parole, 
lawmakers would render their enforcement vulnerable to fraud. [This] polic[y] is equally 
apropos to declarations of disclaimer.”); Hirsch, supra note 170, at 361 (“As a matter of 
substantive law, courts have noted the policy against fraudulent assertions of a disclaimer to 
change distributions.”). 
208 Bryan v. Hyre, 40 Va. 94, 105 (Va. 1842). 
209 See supra Part II.B.3. 
210 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 152–53. 
211 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1227, 1228 (2003) (“The much studied ‘endowment effect’ stands for the principal that 
people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do not. Move a person 
from a city house to a country house and, low and behold, he is quite likely to prefer the 
country house more than he did when he resided in the city. A consequence of the endowment 
effect is the ‘offer-asking gap,’ which is the empirically observed phenomenon that people 
will often demand a higher price to sell a good that they possess than they would pay for the 
same good if they did not possess it at present.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with 
Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1150 (1986) (“Social psychologists have 
demonstrated that people sometimes value things once they have them much more highly 
than they value the same things when they are owned by others.”). See generally WARD 
FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 209–17 
(2007) (explaining that “things seem more valuable to people once they own them,” due to 
the endowment effect). 
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endowment effect, individuals tend to overvalue property that they own and to 
undervalue property that they do not.212 The distortions of the endowment effect are 
directly applicable to the donee’s decision to either accept or to reject a transfer from 
the donor’s estate.213 Because the donee does not yet own the property that she must 
decide whether to disclaim, she might underestimate the utility that she would 
receive from the donor’s gift and consequently might not adequately consider the 
consequences of disclaiming. 
One rationale for allowing the donee to reject a gift is that she can increase the 
utility of the donor’s estate plan by engaging in postmortem estate planning.214 
However, this rationale is undermined if the donee does not accurately value the 
donor’s gift because her decision-making process is distorted by the endowment 
effect. In fact, if the donee does not make rational decisions, then freedom of 
inheritance could actually decrease social welfare. As such, the law should require 
the donee to comply with certain formalities to disclaim a gift to remind her that she 
is making important decisions that warrant careful and thoughtful consideration.215 
Much like will-execution formalities encourage the donor to make deliberate and 
informed decisions regarding how to distribute property upon death,216 disclaimer 
formalities encourage the donee to make deliberate and informed decision regarding 
whether to accept or to reject a gift from the donor’s estate. In this way, formalities 
combat both the moral hazard of testation and the endowment effect by encouraging 
the donor to exercise freedom of disposition and the donee to exercise freedom of 
inheritance in ways that maximizes social welfare.217 
																																								 																				
212 See Charles B. Craver, The Negotiation Process, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 271, 286 
(2003) (“People who own goods that others wish to purchase tend to overvalue those items, 
while individuals who are thinking of buying goods possessed by others tend to undervalue 
those items.”); Debra Pogrund Stark et al., Complex Decision-Making and Cognitive Aging 
Call for Enhanced Protection of Seniors Contemplating Reverse Mortgages, 46 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 299, 338 (2014) (explaining that “endowment effects” occur when “consumers 
overvalue things that they already own and undervalue things that they do not”). 
213 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 152–53. (“Because she has not yet taken possession, a 
disclaiming beneficiary may well view the transaction not as a (painful) loss, but rather as a 
(relatively painless) forgoing of a gain. In consequence, the possibility that she will disclaim 
without due deliberation looms larger . . . .”); Hirsch, supra note 37, at 36 (“How might the 
endowment effect affect the treatment of inherited wealth? Well, that depends. If the 
beneficiary fails to conceptualize an inheritance as really being ‘her’ property, she might be 
less averse to risking or dissipating it . . . This phenomenon, I suspect, may help explain the 
high frequency of disclaimers of inheritances.”). 
214 See supra Sections II.B.3–5. 
215 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 152–53 (suggesting that the possibility that the donee’s 
decision-making process might be distorted by the endowment effect “underscor[es] the 
importance of formal requirements such as a writing that tend to promote reflection”); 
Hirsch, supra note 170, at 361 (explaining that “courts have also observed the usefulness of 
a writing to clarify to beneficiaries that a disclaimer is a legally performative act”). 
216 See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
217 Formalities do not directly cause the donor to internalize all of the costs of her 
decisions, nor do they directly cause the donor to accurately assess the utility of the donor’s 
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Will-execution formalities and disclaimer formalities therefore serve similar 
functions. In particular, they provide evidence of the donor’s and the donee’s intent, 
including evidence that wills and disclaimers are not the product of fraud, and they 
caution the donor and the donee to make reasoned decisions regarding how to 
distribute property upon death and regarding whether to disclaim a transfer from the 
donor’s estate. But just because disclaimer formalities serve similar purposes as will-
execution formalities does not mean that the law should require the same formalities 
in both contexts. Indeed, because formalities limit the manner in which the donee 
can exercise freedom of inheritance, policymakers should tailor the prescribed 
formalities to fit the specific context of disclaimers.  
With this need for tailoring in mind, should the law require the donee to comply 
with the same formalities that the donor must satisfy in order to execute a valid will, 
namely a signed and witnessed writing, as some states currently mandate?218 Or 
should the law follow the lead of other states and require fewer formalities, such as 
a signed writing or perhaps merely a written document without the need of a 
signature? 219  To decide which formalities are appropriate, policymakers must 
evaluate both the difficulty that courts have in deciphering the donee’s intent to 
disclaim, including the risk of fraud, and the possibility that the donee will disclaim 
a gift without adequately considering the costs and benefits of her decisions. If the 
evidentiary difficulties and risk of haphazard decision-making are high, then 
formality levels should be high, but if these concerns are low, then formality levels 
should also be low. 
The evidentiary difficulties associated with deciphering the donee’s intent is 
the first issue that policymakers should consider when selecting the formalities that 
the donee must satisfy to effectively disclaim a gift. When compared with the 
difficulties of identifying the donor’s intent, the court’s task of deciding whether the 
donee intended to disclaim a transfer from the donor’s estate appears relatively easy. 
The court’s task of deciding whether a donor intended a will to be legally effective 
presents problems because a will only becomes legally effective after the donor 
dies,220 and as such the donor need not directly communicate her intent to anyone 
during her life.221 As a result, questions sometimes arise regarding whether the donor 
intended a document found after her death to be a legally effective expression of her 
estate plan.222 The signature and witnessing requirements reduce these evidentiary 
																																								 																				
gift. However, formalities at least encourage the donor and the donee to seriously consider 
their decisions, which might indirectly correct the moral hazard and endowment effect 
distortions that affect their decision-making processes. 
218 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
219 See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text. 
220 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 147. 
221 See Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 608 (Ill. 1955) (“[A] will is ordinarily an 
expression of the secret wish of the testator”); Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead: 
Voice in Last Wills and Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 683, 740 (2011) (“Due to the 
ambulatory nature of wills, many provisions and terms remain secret until the testator’s 
death.”). 
222 See supra notes 184–189 and accompanying text. 
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difficulties because few people would satisfy these requirements without intending 
the will to be legally effective.223 By contrast, fewer evidentiary difficulties arise in 
the context of disclaimers because the donee must affirmatively express her intent 
to disclaim to either the probate court or the donor’s personal representative.224 This 
affirmative act of communication provides reliable evidence that the donee 
unequivocally intended to disclaim the gift from the donor,225 and consequently 
fewer formalities are needed to provide evidence that the donee intended to disclaim 
a transfer from the donor’s estate. 
Additionally, the risk of fraudulent disclaimers is likely less than the risk of 
fraudulent wills. Because a will can distribute property to anyone, the population of 
potential perpetrators of fraud in the context of wills is large.226 Indeed, the impact 
of a fraudulent will on the distribution of the donor’s estate could be significant. By 
contrast, the population of potential perpetrators of fraud in the context of 
disclaimers is relatively small because a disclaimer has only a minor effect on the 
distribution of the donor’s property. When the donee disclaims a gift, an alternate 
donee takes the property instead of the primary donee.227 The identity of the alternate 
donee is set by decisions that the donor made in her estate plan,228 and consequently 
a disclaimer has no effect on the identity of the alternate donee. Instead, a disclaimer 
simply substitutes one donee that the donor selected for another donee that the donor 
selected. Because fewer people have a motive to perpetrate fraud in the context of 
disclaimers than in the context of wills,229 fewer formalities are needed to protect the 
donee from wrongdoing. 
																																								 																				
223 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 153. 
224 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 149 n.187. 
225 This rationale is similar to the rationale that lifetime gifts of personal property must 
be delivered to the donee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP: WILLS AND OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2003) (“Delivery . . . constitutes an 
event that supplies objective evidence [of a gift]”); Hirsch, Formalizing Transfers, supra 
note 147, at 818 (“[D]elivery clarifies that the donor intended an enforceable gift and avoids 
misunderstanding by the donee.”); Chad A. McGowan, Special Delivery: Does the Postman 
Have to Ring at All—The Current State of the Delivery Requirement for Valid Gifts, 31 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 357, 367 (1996) (“Delivery serves as evidence supporting the donee’s 
claim of gift. In other words, possession by an alleged donee would greatly increase the 
likelihood that the donee was telling the truth. If the donee actually possessed the thing given, 
the donor could be said to have actually intended to part with it.”). 
226 See Glover, Probate-Error Costs, supra note 171, at 641–42 (“[T]he wrongdoer 
specifies the gifts that are made through the terms of the fraudulent will, and therefore the 
wrongdoer has wide latitude to describe an estate plan that significantly departs from the 
decedent’s intended estate plan.”). 
227 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 140.  
228  See Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 59, at 163; see also supra note 72–75 and 
accompanying text. 
229 The person with the greatest motivation to produce a fraudulent disclaimer is the 
alternate donee, who stands to directly benefit. However, others might also have a motive to 
produce a fraudulent disclaimer, including anyone who would prefer the alternate donee to 
benefit rather than the primary donee. By contrast, anyone could have a motive to produce a 
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In addition to the evidentiary difficulties of identifying the donee’s intent, 
policymakers should also consider the risk that the donee will exercise her right to 
disclaim without appropriate consideration. One purpose of will formalities is to 
remind the donor that she is making important decisions that warrant careful 
reflection. 230  Disclaimer formalities serve the same purpose; 231  however, fewer 
formalities are necessary in the context of disclaimers because, again, the donee 
must directly communicate her intent to either the probate court or the donor’s 
personal representative. 232  In essence, the requirement that the donee deliver a 
disclaimer serves as a formality that cautions her to make careful decisions. This 
cautioning effect of delivery is recognized in the context of lifetime gifts. To make 
a gift of personal property during life, the donor need not produce a signed and 
witnessed writing. 233  Instead, the donor must deliver either the property or 
something that symbolizes the property to the donee. 234  The donor’s act of 
relinquishing the property serves as a formality that cautions her to make thoughtful 
decisions.235 Similarly, the requirement that the donee deliver a disclaimer, which 
symbolizes the property that she is renouncing, provides the donee an opportunity 
to step back and reconsider her decision to disclaim. And because the donee must 
deliver a disclaimer to the probate court or to the donor’s personal representative, 
																																								 																				
fraudulent will because anyone can directly benefit. An additional wrinkle regarding 
fraudulent disclaimers is that, under some circumstances, the donee must disclaim a gift 
within a specific timeframe. See infra Section III.B. In these instances, the primary donee 
might have a motive to produce a fraudulent disclaimer in order to satisfy the timeliness 
requirement, and consequently disclaimer formalities might be needed to protect against this 
type of fraud. See Hirsch, Code Breakers, supra note 170, at 361 (“By requiring a written 
record, the authors of federal tax law probably sought to preclude fraudulent claims of timely 
disclaimers.”). 
230 See supra notes 201–203 and accompanying text. 
231 See Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 59, at 152–53; see also supra notes 214–217 and 
accompanying text. 
232 See Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 59, at 149 n.187. 
233 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (AM. 
LAW. INST. 2003). Gifts of real property, however, do require certain formalities. See id. § 
6.3. 
234 See Hirsch, supra note 147, at 815 (“Under the traditional view, delivery must be 
‘manual,’ a literal movement of the gift corpus into the hands of the donee . . . unless manual 
delivery is impossible or impracticable. In that event, the donor can substitute an alternative 
form of delivery—either constructive delivery of something (such as a key) that opens up 
access to the gift, or delivery of a writing describing the gift. The modern view, 
acknowledged nowadays by many courts, permits these alternative forms of delivery 
irrespective of the ease of manual delivery.”). 
235 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
6.2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Delivery impresses on the donor that the donor is parting 
with dominion and control . . . .”); McGowan, supra note 225, at 367 (explaining that one 
“purpose of delivery is to caution the donor of the magnitude and consequences of the 
donor’s act”); Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of 
Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348 (1926) 
(“[D]elivery makes vivid and concrete to the donor the significance of the act he doing.”). 
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but does not need to communicate her intent to anyone during life, fewer formalities 
are necessary to serve the cautionary function when a donee disclaims a gift than 
when a donor executes a will. 
Thus, disclaimers seem to present fewer evidentiary difficulties and less risk of 
haphazard decisions than wills. Consequently, the law should require fewer 
formalities for the validity of a disclaimer than for the validity of a will. Specifically, 
because they impede the exercise of freedom of inheritance and are not needed to 
serve an evidentiary or cautionary function, the attestation and notarization 
requirements that some states impose upon disclaimers should be eliminated.236 By 
contrast, the writing and signature formalities are less burdensome and therefore do 
not substantially impede the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance. At the same 
time, these requirements also fulfill the diminished evidentiary and cautionary needs 
within the context of disclaimers.237 Indeed, a signed writing, or at least a simple 
writing, is needed so that the donee can deliver something to the probate court or to 
the donor’s personal representative that symbolizes her relinquishment of the 
disclaimed property.238 In sum, by weighing the evidentiary and cautionary concerns 
of disclaimers along with the potential impediment to a disclaimer’s validity that 
formalities represent, policymakers can facilitate the donee’s exercise of freedom of 
inheritance in a way that maximizes social welfare. 
 
B.  Timeliness 
 
Another way policymakers facilitate freedom of inheritance is by delineating a 
timeframe during which the donee must either accept or reject a gift. Traditionally, 
most disclaimer statutes have imposed a fixed deadline by which the donee must 
exercise her right to disclaim.239 If the donee does not disclaim within the prescribed 
																																								 																				
236 Similar arguments have been made in the context of will execution reform. See 
James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 573 
(1990) (“By continuing to insist on attestation, our current legal system does not protect 
testators from others. Instead, it protects many testators from effectuating their own estate 
plans.”). The merit of eliminating witnessing requirements is debatable. See Glover, Probate-
Error Risk, supra note 173, at 373–77. However, the argument seems to be stronger in the 
context of disclaimers. 
237 See Langbein, supra note 201, at 498 (“Writing and signature are the minimum 
requirements which assure finality, accuracy and authenticity of purported testamentary 
expressions.”). 
238 A related issue that is beyond the scope of this Article is whether a “writing” should 
be limited to a physical document or whether electronic mediums should satisfy the writing 
requirement for valid disclaimers. See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT § 5 cmt. 
(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) (acknowledging that “a 
disclaimer may be prepared in forms other than typewritten pages with a signature in pen” 
and authorizing electronic disclaimers); Hirsch, supra note 170, at 362 (explaining that “five 
jurisdictions have modified this provision of UDPIA to permit only disclaimers that a 
beneficiary executes in a signed writing” and suggesting that “[t]his modification appears 
justified as a matter of public policy, although the issue is debatable”). 
239 See Hirsch, supra note 170, at 335–36. 
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time, she must accept the gift.240 A timeliness requirement for an effective disclaimer 
would seem to undermine the social welfare maximization goal of the law because 
it serves as yet another hurdle that the donee must navigate in order to effectively 
disclaim a gift. Some donees who want to reject a transfer from the donor’s estate 
will fail to do so within the prescribed timeframe, and in these instances the social 
welfare benefits of a disclaimer will not be realized.241  
Furthermore, one rationale for granting the donee freedom of inheritance is that 
the donor may have had imperfect information at the time she crafted her estate plan. 
Without the ability to fully understand the future needs of her family, the donor 
likely cannot make decisions regarding the disposition of her property that perfectly 
account for changing circumstances between the time she crafts her estate plan and 
the time that she dies.242  As such, the donor might make decisions that fail to 
maximize the social welfare generated by the distribution of her estate. However, 
freedom of inheritance allows the donee to assess the utility of the donor’s estate 
plan at the time of the donor’s death, and consequently the donee has better 
information regarding familial needs.243 If, based on the circumstances that exist at 
the time of the donor’s death, the alternate donee would benefit more from the 
donor’s property than the primary donee, the primary donee can increase the utility 
of the donor’s estate plan by exercising her right to disclaim. 244  A disclaimer 
deadline would therefore seem to limit a donee’s ability to address the problems 
created by the donor’s exercise of freedom of disposition with imperfect 
information. After all, the longer the donee has to decide whether to accept or to 
reject the transfer from the donee, the greater the opportunity the donee has to 
acquire better information. 
Because a deadline represents a potential stumbling block for the effectiveness 
of a disclaimer and also limits the donee’s ability to acquire information regarding 
the utility of accepting or rejecting a gift, a timeliness requirement could diminish 
the social welfare benefits of freedom of inheritance. Consequently, policymakers 
should impose a deadline only in specific scenarios in which a timeliness 
requirement serves an important purpose. For instance, federal tax law imposes a 
nine-month timeliness requirement for effective disclaimers that starts at the donor’s 
death.245 If the donee does not disclaim within this timeframe, a disclaimer will not 
																																								 																				
240 See id. 
241 See id. at 336 (“[A] deadline for disclaiming discriminates against more poorly 
counseled beneficiaries, who stand at greater risk of overstepping the time limit as a result 
of ignorance or possibly indecision.”). In this regard, a timeliness requirement resembles the 
formalities with which the donee must comply to effectively disclaim a gift from the donor. 
See supra notes 182–183 and accompanying text. Both present the possibility that a 
disclaimer will be ineffective despite that the donee truly intended to disclaim a gift. 
242 See supra Part II.B.4. 
243 See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1892–93; Weisbord, supra note 124, at 1936. 
244 See supra notes 125–143 and accompanying text. 
245 See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A) (West 2017). For donees who are under the age of 
twenty-one, the deadline is nine months after reaching the age of twenty-one. See id. § 
2518(b)(2)(B).  
2017] FREEDOM OF INHERITANCE 323 
be effective for federal tax purposes.246 As explained above, a prolonged disclaimer 
period in this context might have social welfare benefits;247 however, it also has the 
potential cost of disrupting the federal tax system.248 
To illustrate, an open-ended disclaimer period could hinder timely and accurate 
tax reporting. If the donor’s executor were allowed to delay filing the donor’s estate 
tax return indefinitely while a donee decides whether to accept or to reject a gift, 
administration of the federal wealth transfer tax system would become slow and 
inefficient. Likewise, allowing the donee to disclaim a gift after the executor files 
the donor’s estate tax return would inject confusion and inconsistency within the tax 
system.249 As Professor Grayson McCouch explains,  
 
[R]equiring that a disclaimer generally be made promptly . . . facilitates 
orderly administration of federal transfer taxes . . . . [Conversely,] 
[p]ermitting a transferee to make a tax-free disclaimer after the expiration 
of the limitation period for assessing tax on the original transfer would 
create uncertainty and severely disrupt transfer tax administration.250  
 
Thus, although a disclaimer deadline generally would seem to undermine the social 
welfare goal of the law, such a deadline for tax purposes may actually increase social 
welfare by fostering an efficient tax system.251 
Although a disclaimer time limit might serve an important purpose for tax 
purposes, such a deadline likely does not increase social welfare outside the realm 
of tax-motivated disclaimers. Unlike its effect on the federal wealth transfer tax 
																																								 																				
246 For a discussion of the effect of disclaimers within the context of federal wealth 
transfer taxes, see supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra notes 241–244 and accompanying text. 
248 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 125; Hirsch, supra note 170, at 336.  
249  
 
For example, the transfer may qualify for a marital deduction if the interest 
passes to the transferor’s spouse, or it may be subject to special gift tax valuation 
rules if the transferee is a ‘member of the transferor’s family,’ or it may avoid 
triggering a generation-skipping transfer tax if the transferee is a ‘non-skip 
person.’ In each case, however, a disclaimer by the original transferee might shift 
the interest to another person and produce dramatically different tax results. 
 
Grayson M.P. McCouch, Timely Disclaimers and Taxable Transfers, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1043, 1054–55 (1993). 
250  Id.; see Hirsch, supra note 170, at 336 (explaining that a disclaimer deadline 
“facilitates timely tax reporting”). 
251 Within the context of the federal tax system, a fixed disclaimer deadline may also 
have other benefits. See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 125 (“Within the tax sphere, a short 
deadline on disclaimers serves the purpose of maintaining the fiscal integrity of the estate 
tax, by ensuring the beneficiary’s opportunity to engage in postmortem tax planning does 
not exceed those that the benefactor could have exploited at the time of death.”). 
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system,252 an unlimited disclaimer period would not significantly disrupt the probate 
process. Indeed, a prolonged delay in the donee’s decision either to accept or to 
reject a gift would likely only inconvenience the alternate donee who must endure 
the uncertainty regarding whether she will receive disclaimed property.253 Other 
donees within the donor’s estate plan will not be affected, as they can accept property 
as soon as the executor is ready to commence the distribution of the donor’s estate.254 
Thus, although a time limit on disclaimers may serve important purposes for 
tax purposes,255 policymakers should eliminate any general deadline for the donee 
to decide whether to accept or to reject a transfer from the donor’s estate because 
doing so would likely increase social welfare. 256  An unlimited timeframe for 
disclaimers would make the disclaimer process simpler and increase the likelihood 
that a donee who wants to disclaim will do so effectively.257 In turn, the social 
welfare benefits of disclaimers will more likely be realized. Furthermore, without 
the need to disclaim within a prescribed period, the donee has a greater opportunity 
to collect information regarding the utility that would be produced by either 
accepting or rejecting the gift. By exercising freedom of inheritance with better 
information, the donee can increase the welfare generated by the disposition of the 
donor’s estate. 258  Thus, the elimination of a general disclaimer deadline would 
facilitate the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance and would not significantly 
disrupt the probate process. 
																																								 																				
252 See supra notes 245–251 and accompanying text. 
253  See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 126 n.89 (“One might argue that alternative 
beneficiaries . . . bear part of the cost of the delay, although anything they gain from a 
disclaimer is, from their perspective, a windfall.”). Of course, a delay in the donee’s decision 
to accept or to reject a gift could also inconvenience the donee herself. See id. at 126 (“[T]he 
only persons inconvenienced by the delay are the undecided beneficiaries themselves. And 
when the cost of further delay outweighs the benefit of indecision, then presumably they will 
make their election.”). A prolonged disclaimer period could also raise other concerns. See 
Hirsch, supra note 170, at 337 (“The key issue is whether a protracted right of disclaimer 
might permit beneficiaries to deceive a potential lender into extending credit on the strength 
of an inheritance that they then decline to accept. This danger appears illusory. So long as 
they have not taken possession of an inheritance, beneficiaries are not ostensible owners.”). 
254 See Hirsch, supra note 59, at 126 (“If beneficiaries procrastinate over the question 
of whether or not to accept an inheritance, the personal representative will have to hold the 
estate open until they come to a decision. Yet, on reflection, the costs thereby occasioned 
appear inconsequential, for the personal representative can proceed with dispatch to 
distribute the balance of the state . . . .”). 
255 See supra notes 246–251 and accompanying text. 
256  The UDPIA has suggested such a reform. See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. 
INTERESTS ACT prefatory note (1999) (“It does not . . . include a specific time limit on the 
making of any disclaimer. Because a disclaimer is a refusal to accept, the only bar to a 
disclaimer should be acceptance of the offer.”). 
257  See Hirsch, Revisions, supra note 59, at 124 (explaining that “the benefit of 
UDPIA’s innovation is one of simplification: By eliminating the time limit . . . [the UDPIA] 
increase[s] the probability that the beneficiary will disclaim effectively.”). 
258 See supra Part II.B.4. 
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C.  Restrictions 
 
Perhaps the most straightforward way that the law facilitates both the donor’s 
freedom of disposition and the donee’s freedom of inheritance is by limiting the 
restrictions it places on such freedoms. For instance, the law denies courts the 
general ability to second-guess the merits of the donor’s and the donee’s decisions. 
As the Restatement explains, “American law does not grant courts any general 
authority to question the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s 
decisions about how to allocate his or her property.” 259  Likewise, the UDPIA 
suggests that courts should not question the donee’s decisions when it explains that 
the donee’s ability to disclaim a gift is “comprehensive” and that the law is 
“[generally] designed to allow every sort of disclaimer.”260 Thus, a general principle 
of the modern law of succession is that the court should honor the donor’s and the 
donee’s respective freedoms by carrying out their intent. 
Although the law typically defers to the donor’s decisions regarding how 
property should be distributed upon death, it restricts the donor’s freedom of 
disposition in certain circumstances.261 As explained previously,262 the law generally 
requires the donor to transfer a portion of her estate to her surviving spouse.263 
Regardless of whether the donor unequivocally expresses the intent to disinherit her 
surviving spouse, the law prevents her from doing so.264 Because this forced spousal 
share restricts, rather than facilitates, the donor’s freedom of disposition, its place 
within the law of succession should be based upon important policy considerations. 
Indeed, if freedom of disposition is justified as a mechanism for maximizing the 
utility generated by the distribution of the donor’s estate, any restriction on this 
freedom should be founded upon a social welfare rationale. 
																																								 																				
259 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE 
RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 6–7 (2010) (explaining that under “American 
law . . . freedom of testation is paramount and the courts have no power to deviate from a 
person’s will”). 
260 UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010); see Bender, supra note 78, at 892 (“Traditionally, 
courts could not examine the motivation behind a disclaimer.”); Ellsworth, supra note 57, at 
703 (“Ordinarily, the purpose for which a disclaimer is made has no bearing on its validity.”); 
see also Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1872 (“Under most circumstances today, beneficiaries are 
free to accept or reject an inheritance as they see fit.”); Hirsch, supra note 7, at 588 (“The 
beneficiary of a gratuity may accept or reject it at his discretion.”). 
261 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the 
extent that the donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is prohibited 
or restricted by an overriding rule of law.”); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1138–40. 
262 See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
263 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 512–16; see, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE 
§ 2-201 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). 
264 See Rosenbury, supra note 69, at 1245. 
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In this regard, the forced spousal share can be justified as a way to limit the 
negative externalities produced by the donor’s estate plan. Although the donor is in 
the best position to make decisions regarding how to dispose of property after 
death,265 certain aspects of estate planning suggest that the donor might not make 
decisions that maximize social welfare.266 One of these considerations is that the 
donor can make decisions that produce costs that she does not internalize.267 If the 
donor bears the costs of her estate plan, then decisions that maximize the donor’s 
individual utility likely also maximize overall social welfare because the donor can 
weigh all the costs and benefits of certain decisions and make choices that generate 
the greatest utility. However, if the donor’s decisions have costs that are born by 
others, an estate planning decision that maximizes the donor’s individual utility 
might not maximize social welfare.268 These external costs, which are known as 
negative externalities, might warrant the law’s imposition of certain restrictions on 
freedom of disposition in order to further its social welfare maximization goal.269 
Consider again the forced spousal share. The donor generally is in the best 
position to decide what portion of her estate to give to her surviving spouse and what 
portion of her estate to give to others. Thus, if the donor internalizes all of the costs 
of the decision to disinherit her surviving spouse, the law can rely upon the donor to 
maximize the utility generated from her estate plan. However, the donor might not 
internalize all of the costs produced by her decision to disinherit a surviving 
spouse.270 For instance, without an inheritance from the donor, the surviving spouse 
may need to seek support from social services programs, and the cost of the 
surviving spouse’s care could consequently fall on society as a whole, rather than 
on the donor as an individual. 271  Because the donor might not consider these 
potential costs when she is crafting her estate plan, a donor’s decision to disinherit 
a surviving spouse might not maximize social welfare. The law therefore imposes 
the forced spousal share, in part, to ensure that the donor’s estate plan does not 
																																								 																				
265 See supra Part I.B.2. 
266 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1158 (“[T]here are several theoretical reasons why 
effectuating the donor’s express wishes may diverge from what is socially optimal, including 
(1) imperfect information, (2) negative externalities, and (3) intergenerational equity.”); see 
also SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 70–71 (including “the cost and impracticality of making 
highly refined arrangements for dead hand control,” “harmful external effects,” and “inherent 
inequality in the wealth of the present generation versus that of future generations” among 
the “[v]alid arguments against dead hand control of property”). 
267 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1161–63 (“Externalities . . . may arise because of a 
disposition of property at death.”). 
268 See id. at 1161 (explaining that “an owner (here, the donor) may have an incentive 
to undertake activity (in this case, a gift at death) if the ‘activity’s private benefits exceed its 
private costs even though, as a result of the externality, the activity is undesirable as its social 
costs exceed its social benefits’”). 
269 See id. at 1161–63. 
270 See id. at 1162. 
271 See id.; SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 65. 
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generate negative externalities, which in turn increases the likelihood the donor’s 
estate planning decisions maximize social welfare.272 
Just as certain restrictions of freedom of disposition might increase the utility 
generated from the distribution of the donor’s estate, some restrictions of freedom 
of inheritance might also maximize social welfare. Although the donee is in the best 
position to decide whether to accept or reject a gift from the donor, 273  certain 
circumstances suggest that she might not exercise her freedom of inheritance in a 
way that maximizes social welfare. One of these situations involves Medicaid 
eligibility. Medicaid is a governmental assistance program that provides health care 
benefits to individuals with limited financial resources. 274  A donee’s decision 
whether to accept or to reject a gift from the donor can affect the donee’s Medicaid 
eligibility. For instance, a donee who is receiving Medicaid benefits might become 
ineligible if she were to accept a gift from the donor. In such a situation, the donee 
has a choice: she can accept the gift and lose her Medicaid eligibility or she can 
reject the gift and maintain her Medicaid eligibility.275 
Although the law typically defers to the donee to make such choices, the law 
restricts the donee’s freedom of inheritance in this situation. While the donee can 
reject a gift while receiving Medicaid benefits, the law includes the disclaimed 
property within the donee’s Medicaid eligibility calculation.276 Thus, the law does 
not directly limit the donee’s freedom of inheritance in this situation because the 
donee can still choose whether to accept or to reject a gift; however, it indirectly 
limits freedom of inheritance by eliminating some of the benefit that the donee 
receives from disclaiming. The rationale underlying this restriction on freedom of 
inheritance is similar to the rationale of the forced spousal share,277 as both are 
designed to address a problem of negative externalities. Just as the donor will not 
bear all of the costs of her decision to disinherit her surviving spouse, the donee will 
not bear the costs of her decision to maintain Medicaid eligibility by disclaiming a 
gift.278 Under either scenario, the cost of support falls on society as a whole, rather 
																																								 																				
272 See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1162. 
273 See supra Part II.B.4. 
274 See John A. Miller, Medicaid Spend Down, Estate Recovery and Divorce: Doctrine, 
Planning and Policy, 23 ELDER L.J. 41, 46–47 (2015). 
275 See Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1896 (“Medicaid provides medical benefits to citizens 
in financial distress. An inheritance relieves that distress and can cause a citizen to become 
ineligible. In turn, a beneficiary might disclaim an inheritance in an effort to maintain his or 
her eligibility.”). 
276 See id. at 1897 (“With few exceptions, state courts testing the issue . . . have judged 
disclaimers ineffective to render beneficiaries eligible for Medicaid. Wherever courts have 
allowed them, state legislators have reacted promptly to overturn the decisions. No federal 
court has yet spoken to the matter.”); see, e.g., Troy v. Hart, 697 A.2d 113, 118 (Md. 1997). 
277 See supra notes 270–272 and accompanying text. 
278 See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 602 (“[D]isclaimers by the devisee would have resulted 
in her continued dependence upon Medicaid payments, whereas ‘the purpose of [Medicaid 
is] to aid only the economically disadvantaged persons: the economic viability of the 
Medicaid program itself can be maintained only if the eligibility requirements are diligently 
observed.’” (quoting In re Scrivani, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (citations 
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than on the individual decision-maker. As a result, the decision-maker, whether the 
donor or the donee, might not make decisions that maximize social welfare, and the 
law therefore restricts both freedom of disposition and freedom of inheritance in 
ways that are designed to limit the negative externalities that are produced by the 
exercise of these freedoms. 
In sum, because freedom of inheritance plays an important role in furthering 
the law’s overarching objective of maximizing social welfare,279 the law should be 
designed to facilitate the donee’s exercise of this freedom. Specifically, when both 
prescribing the form that a valid disclaimer must take and the time period during 
which the donee must express her intent to disclaim, policymakers should balance 
the benefits of disclaimer formalities and deadlines with the social welfare benefits 
of freedom of inheritance.280  Likewise, policymakers should consider the law’s 
social welfare maximization goal when crafting restrictions on freedom of 
inheritance. Because restrictions on freedom of inheritance hinder the facilitative 
function of the law, they should be analyzed from a social welfare perspective to 





The donor is not the sole decision-maker regarding the disposition of her 
property upon death. To be sure, the donor enjoys broad freedom to craft an estate 
plan to her liking.282 But when the donor decides to make a gift to a particular donee, 
the donee must also make a decision. Specifically, she must decide either to accept 
the gift from the donor or to reject it.283 The donee’s discretion to accept or to reject 
a transfer from the donor’s estate can be labeled “freedom of inheritance”284 and 
stands alongside the donor’s freedom of disposition as important elements of the 
modern law of succession. 
  
																																								 																				
omitted)); Hirsch, supra note 56, at 1898 (“In crafting the law, the rationale for suppression 
of Medicaid planning is clear. The program exists to benefit the ‘truly needy,’ not those who 
‘created their own need,’ as one court has put it. If allowed to determine Medicaid eligibility, 
disclaimers would impose an ‘unnecessar[y] . . . burden on taxpayers.’” (quoting Molloy v. 
Bane, 631 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (App. Div. 1995); Tannler v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. 
Sers., 564 N.W.2d 735, 741 (Wis. 1997) (citations omitted)).  
279  See supra Part II. 
280  See supra Parts III.A–B. 
281  See supra Part III.C. 
282  See supra Part I. 
283  See supra Part II.A. 
284  See supra note 5. 
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The donee can exercise freedom of inheritance in a number of ways. For 
instance, when a donee accepts a transfer from the donor’s estate, she exercises 
freedom of inheritance.285 Likewise, when a surviving spouse elects to take the 
forced spousal share, she exercises this freedom. 286  Conversely, when a donee 
declines to take a share of the donor’s estate, either by disclaiming her interest in the 
donor’s property or by opting not to take the forced spousal share, she also exercises 
freedom of inheritance.287 
Although legal scholars have explained that the donor’s freedom of disposition 
plays an important role in maximizing social welfare,288 little attention has been paid 
to the role that the donee’s freedom of inheritance plays in maximizing the utility 
generated from the donor’s estate. The donor is generally in the best position to 
evaluate the needs of her friends and family,289 and consequently the law typically 
defers to her to make decisions that place property in the hands of donees who will 
benefit the most. However, there is no guarantee that the donor will accurately assess 
the utility of her estate plan or that she will actually make the best decisions. 
The donee’s freedom of inheritance acts as a check on the donor’s freedom of 
disposition that increases the likelihood that the distribution of the donor’s estate 
will maximize social welfare. For instance, by reviewing the donor’s decision to 
give her a gift at the time the donor dies rather than at the time the donor crafts her 
estate plan, the donee likely has better information regarding the utility of the 
transfer.290 With this better information regarding the circumstances at the time the 
donor’s property is distributed, the donee can increase the utility of the donor’s estate 
plan by rejecting the gift if an alternate donee would derive greater benefit from the 
property. Freedom of inheritance therefore maximizes social welfare by alleviating 
the problem of imperfect information that exists when the donor makes her estate 
planning decisions, and indeed, the donee’s ability to decide for herself whether to 
accept or to reject a gift from the donor can increase the social welfare benefits of 
the donor’s estate plan in numerous other ways.291 
Because freedom of inheritance plays an important role in maximizing social 
welfare, the law should facilitate the donee’s exercise of this freedom. When crafting 
the requirements for valid disclaimers, policymakers should balance the policy 
objectives of these requirements, such as the formalities with which the donee must 
comply and the timeframe during which the donee must exercise her right to 
disclaim, with the social welfare benefits of broad freedom of inheritance. 292 
Similarly, policymakers should analyze the explicit restrictions that they place on 
the donee’s freedom of inheritance from a social welfare perspective to ensure that 
a limitation on the donee’s discretion to accept or to reject a gift increases the utility 
																																								 																				
285  See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
286  See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 60–71 and accompanying text. 
288 See supra Part I.B.; see, e.g., Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135. 
289 See supra Part I.B.2. 
290 See supra Part II.B.4. 
291 See supra Part II.B. 
292 See supra Parts III.A–B. 
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generated from the transfer of the donor’s estate.293 In sum, like the donor’s freedom 
of disposition, the donor’s freedom of inheritance plays an important role in pursuing 
the law’s social welfare maximization goal, and policymakers should be aware of 
this role when crafting the law of succession. 
																																								 																				
293 See supra Part III.C. 
